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DRAFT REPORT 
 
A parallel approach to analysis of costs/benefits and efficiency changes resulting from privatisation of 
health services 
 
1 Introduction 
Privatisation of health services takes many forms.  It is an implicit element of health sector reform, which is 
underpinned by fiscal reform. New systems of fiscal control, new ways of allocating resources in line with 
overall government goals and pressure to improve the use of resources are three dimensions of fiscal 
reform that have implications for the health sector (Schick, 1998). Allocation of resources in line with 
government goals has meant that the interests of the finance and treasury ministries are dominant. This 
may affect the health sector directly because the goals of the finance ministry will often not be those of the 
health ministry (Verheul and Rowson, 2001). It also leads to a greater emphasis on performance 
management (Kaul, 1997). Outputs and outcomes are not always easy to define in the health sector and 
can lead to a distortion of healthcare delivery e.g. increases in “throughput”, which focus on the numbers 
of patients treated rather than the quality of care. 
New systems of fiscal control are often accompanied by the introduction of market mechanisms, which 
affect the health sector in several ways:  business principles and practices are introduced to healthcare 
institutions, often as part of wider organizational restructuring. This process is known as corporatization 
and is taking place in both developing and developed countries (Polidano,1999).   It is almost always 
accompanied by the introduction of the purchaser-provider split within a national healthcare system to 
create an internal market. The outsourcing and contracting out of services, for example, catering, cleaning, 
facilities management, hospital management and clinical services is part of an overall process of 
privatisation.  Drug manufacturing and drug distribution may also be privatised.  Together these processes 
constitute a process of marketisation. 
Public Services International commissioned this study of ‘A parallel approach to analysis of costs/benefits 
and efficiency changes resulting from privatisation of health services’ in December 2010 as a way of 
drawing together evidence of the impact of health care privatisation on service users and health workers.  
Although informed by studies in water and municipal services (Bel et al, 2010) which have not found 
evidence of lower cost with private production, designing a study for the health care sector is more 
complicated because of some of the difficulties in measuring the costs and benefits of health services as 
well as the efficiency and effectiveness of health service delivery.   Outputs and outcomes are not always 
easy to define in the health sector and can lead to a distortion of healthcare delivery, for example, 
increases in “throughput”, which focus on the numbers of patients treated rather than the quality of care. 
The delivery of health care depends on the intervention being given to a patient but also the quality of care 
received by the patient.  Health care delivery is a labour intensive activity whose quality is strongly 
influenced by the condition of the workforce and their relationships with service users.  Overall health care 
budgets need to analysed in relation to the quantity and quality of care delivered as well as the proportion 
spent on administration and management.       
 
Some initial search findings were presented to the Public Services International Health Services Taskforce 
(HSTF) on 14 February 2011 (Appendix 1).  The discussions that followed the presentation highlighted a 
number of issues that PSI affiliates felt should be explored further in the research.  These issues were: 
 Debt is being used across the world to justify privatisation.   
 Marketization, competition and privatization are all linked even though privatisation does not take 
place immediately.   
 Older care services, laundry, pharmacy, cleaning are all being privatised. 
  User charges are being introduced in US, Ireland and developing countries.   
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 Pressure for privatization of social insurance is starting. 
 General confusion about the boundaries between the public and private sectors 
 Once access to public services is restricted, then private insurance will be promoted to cover costs 
of co-payments. 
There was a consensus that any evidence to show how marketisation introduces processes into public 
health systems, which eventually lead to privatisation, would be important for campaigning.  A second topic 
that emerged from discussions was the extent of privatisation of care services for older people, which is 
more extensive in many countries than health care privatisation.  Age care (services for older people) is a 
service which has experienced extensive privatisation in almost all regions of the world.  With increasing 
demographic pressure the demand for age care is growing.  The processes which have led to privatisation 
and the results of privatisation for both service users and workers can be used as an example of the impact 
of privatisation on access and quality of services as well as quality of working conditions.   
 
The processes that result in health care privatisation covers what can be seen as a continuum of 
commercialisation.  These start from the introduction of internal markets to public health systems, 
corporatisation of public hospitals, contracting out of services, public–private partnerships and ultimately 
the privatisation of health care services.  These terms have been included in the search terms, so that the 
literature reviewed would cover many of these stages which influence/ presents how the private sector 
enters the public health care sector. 
 
Initial use of the terms privatisation of health services generated a number of studies but the use of the 
term health sector reform generated a much wider range of studies which reflected the nature of the 
changes taking place in health systems.  It is through these studies that privatisation can be explored more 
fully. It is not always the immediate presence of the private sector that leads to fundamental changes in 
health systems but rather the introduction of market mechanisms to public health systems, often described 
as marketisation. 
 
Table 1: Search terms and databases 
 
Criteria Swets 
wise 
Sci 
Verse 
Wiley Informa 
World 
Medline JAMA Sage 
National health 
expenditure 
       
Privatis(z)ation health 
insurance  
       
Efficiency / 
effectiveness health 
care 
       
Health interventions & 
choice of care 
       
Quality of life        
Workers insecurities        
Commodification of 
health 
       
Health outcomes        
Privatis(z)ation        
Health sector reform        
Marketis(z)ation 
health care 
       
Corporatis(z)ation 
hospitals 
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Contracting out of 
health services 
       
Public-private 
partnerships 
       
Commercialis(z)ation 
of health care 
       
 
These searches generated a wide range of references which were then grouped according to the main 
themes identified in the initial proposal.  
 Overall national health expenditure 
 Privatisation of health insurance schemes 
 Efficiency and  health care facilities  
 Changing access to health services  
 Changing patterns of health interventions and choice of care 
 Measuring overall patient mortality, morbidity and quality of life  
 Changing workers securities, working conditions and health care 
 Commodification of health care tasks and impact on health care 
 Changes in health outcomes 
 
Terminology 
Several authors have tried to explain the changes that take place in health systems as either different ways 
of classifying privatisation or different categories of marketisation (Leys, 2004; Whitfield, 2006,).  These are 
strongly influenced by the national health care systems that shape the impact of marketisation.    The 
stages of privatisation take several years or even decades to evolve.  It is important to identify the stages of 
marketisation that often precede full privatisation.  The use of terms that ‘soften’  the impact of changes to 
existing government systems can be seen in words such “diverse providers”, “mixed providers”, “co-
payments”, “partnerships”.  These terms do not mention privatisation but describe new relationships which 
underpin privatisation.  In the table below, a typology of privatisation and marketisation is set out.   
 
Table 2: Typology of privatisation and marketisation for the health sector 
 
Process Examples 
Marketisation and 
privatisation of global public 
goods 
 Public health 
 Deregulation of protection of natural resources 
Marketisation and 
privatisation of assets and 
services 
 Commissioning of public services from private & 
voluntary sector – diverse or mixed providers 
 Marketisation and expansion of private services 
 Private financing of infrastructure and services with 
public-private partnerships/ private finance initiative 
 Choice and personalisation of services 
 Deregulation/ liberalisation and reregulation 
 Commercialisation of public services 
 Sale of assets to private sector 
 Sale and lease back of government buildings 
 Increased household responsibility for payments and care 
– informal payments, user fees 
Privatisation of governance 
and democracy 
 Contract governance 
 Corporatisation of quasi-public bodies, e.g. hospitals 
 Private companies established within public services 
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 Privatisation of public interest information and resulting 
reduction of transparency and disclosure 
Privatisation of public domain  Public service values replaced by market ideology and 
commercial values 
 Privatisation of public intellectual capital 
Source: Adapted from Whitfield, 2006 
 
Another way of examining privatisation is to map out a taxonomy of privatisation, which aims to place the 
different arrangements for commissioning and provision of services in a public- private framework.   The 
table 
 
Table 3: Public-private taxonomy for health care   
 
Public Private 
State Public but not state Not for profit For profit  
Ministry of Health Regional & local 
government 
Community based 
Religious 
Charitable 
NGOs 
Small businesses, 
e.g. Primary care 
physicians 
National Boards Public corporations  Large corporations 
Source: Saltman, 2003 
 
This taxonomy shows some of the different categories of public and private arrangements for health care 
provision.  These will not necessarily apply to all countries but will be shaped by the existing arrangements 
for health care provision.  For example, some countries have an existing charitable/ non-governmental 
organisation health care sector.    
 
Health reforms/ privatisation by country and service 
An initial search for articles on privatisation by region, shows that there are a range of studies that examine 
the impact of privatisation on health care delivery.  In terms of the volume of studies, there are many more 
detailed studies of health care services in specific countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America, than in 
specific African countries.  The majority of the studies identified so far, examine specific countries, for 
example, Malaysia, India, Indonesia and China or countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  There are also a 
series of multi-country comparisons, most often covering countries of Central and Eastern Europe.   A series 
of country studies may form the basis of a meta-synthesis. 
 
Privatisation of specific services 
There are a growing number of studies of specific services and their experience of privatisation, rather than 
a more general analysis of privatisation of health services.  Given that the nature of the health care 
privatisation process has often been one of step by step privatisation of specific services, the growth of 
research into specific services, such as pathology and reproductive health services, is helpful.    
 
Institutional changes 
One of the issues that almost all studies seem to struggle with, in a methodological sense, is how to asses 
the impact of institutional changes on service delivery.  There are several reasons for difficulties in 
assessing institutional change.  In many countries, the time scale involved is relatively short.  For example, 
in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the change from the pre-1989 socialist system to a free market 
system has taken place over a maximum of twenty years.   
 
Secondly, not all public health systems are exactly the same and many have been influenced strongly by 
their national historical traditions as well the Welfare state model adopted by a country.  Some European 
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countries have had some form of private sector involvement in the public sector for several decades.  In 
other countries, private sector involvement is new.  Similarly, the health care systems of Latin America have 
a different structure and history to health care systems in Africa or Asia.  The United States has a history 
that is also different, but is becoming of greater interest as the level of marketisation in many national 
health care systems increases. 
 
A smaller group of studies are attempting to explore what happens when public and private health care 
sectors work together more closely, forming a ‘hybrid health space’, which is no longer a public health 
sector.  A meta-synthesis of studies of health sector reforms will be used to show how this ‘hybrid health 
space’ is emerging by region.  
 
Finance related issues 
One of the issues emerging in the studies of finance-related issues is the timescale that is being examined.  
Studies take different time periods.  Assuming that the implementation of most privatisation policies 
started in the 1980s, at the earliest, no study will have a time scale of longer than 30 years.  Many studies 
are looking at initial changes in the 1990s, with some taking a longer period which includes the period after 
2000.  Some of the studies are showing that there are different phases of privatisation and reform and that 
in some cases the aims of privatisation have not been fulfilled.   One of the first phases of decentralisation 
is often a reform in the way that funding is provided by central government to local and municipal 
authorities. 
 
Health outcomes  
Studies on overall national health expenditure and health outcomes are most likely to have been 
commissioned by regional and international agencies, such as the European Union, OECD, the World Bank 
or the World Health Organization.  Comparability of studies depends on how figures for national health 
expenditure are collected and establishing common elements of national health expenditure.  One key 
issue is the extent of spending on management and administration costs and what proportion of 
expenditure is spent directly on health care.    The World Health Organization in the 2000 World Health 
Report attempted to link health outcomes with organisational issues, which generated extensive debate 
about whether the methodology was valid. 
 
The issue of how to assess organisational changes becomes even more problematic when examining 
changes in health outcomes and trying to establish a link with health care expenditure.  Institutional 
reforms often address several aspects of organisational change.  Attributing changes in health outcomes to 
a specific institutional change is difficult.   
 
Changing access to health services  
The main indicators of changing access to health services are taken as the introduction of informal 
payments to staff or user fees for specific treatments.  These are often regionally defined.  In Central and 
Eastern Europe informal payments to staff have been subject to a range of research studies.  In Africa, the 
introduction of user fees, following structural adjustment policies in the 1980s and 1990s, has been the 
subject of many national studies.  There is a growing body of research on informal payments and user fees, 
which will be considered as the basis of further analysis.  
 
Changing patterns of health interventions and choice of care 
There are a number of studies which examine how different types of interventions, such as end-stage renal 
disease, are accessed in different types of health care system, comparing predominantly public provision 
with private provision.  Some of the results showed different levels of access to home based care as 
compared to hospital based care.  Studies of the use of caesarean sections during childbirth have shown to 
influenced by patterns of public and private provision.   
 
Competition, hospital efficiency and privatisation 
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An Australian review of literature on privatisation and corporatisation (Centre for Clinical Governance 
Research in Health, 2007) in the period 1980-2007 found that the assumption that privatisation of health 
services will ensure private sector efficiency is questioned on many levels.  Privatisation can lead to poorer 
quality services, loss of nursing jobs in the public sector, reduced access to services for poorer patients, 
weaker trust relationships between doctors and patients. 
 
A review (Rosenau & Linder, 2003) that looked at 20 years of research comparing for-profit and non-profit 
health providers, in the United States, showed that overall non-profit hospitals show better results on cost 
than for profit providers and so argues that the America policy of increasing for-profit providers is 
misguided.   This study only looks at non profits and for profits, not at public hospitals but it findings are 
useful. 
 
A review of several studies that examine the impact of competition on the efficiency of hospitals in 
different countries show varied results, which can be influenced by the institutional settings (public, private 
and non-profit).  Studies that look at the impact of ownership on efficiency in the health care sector, rather 
than the impact of competition on efficiency in the public and private sectors, show a slightly more 
consistent set of results, in that public hospitals are more likely to be efficient, although this too depends 
on how efficiency is measured.   
 
Studies of European countries show varying results but two studies of German hospitals both show that 
efficiency varies with types of ownership and that public hospitals are more efficient than private or 
nonprofits.  Several studies have looked at the impact of competition through the internal market in UK and 
found that competition has had a limited impact on efficiency, even though the studies were undertaken in 
the early years of the internal market.  One or two more recent studies are starting to show slightly 
different results, but are still only the subject on one or two interventions, which is not a complete health 
care system. 
 
Changing workers securities 
Studies looking at different aspects of workers securities are sometimes single country studies or groups of 
similar countries or health care systems. This research examines the changing nature of health care work 
and the impact on training and professionalisation.    Health care labour research is gradually building up a 
body of research but it is frequently nationally framed.  Trade union research is most likely to adopt a multi-
country approach, although there are country studies commissioned by national trade unions. 
 
Recognition of role of state 
Studies of decentralisation and health care reforms in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are 
beginning to conclude that a central state has a role to play in policy formulation/ implementation and 
regulation.  A number of studies are beginning to highlight the problems of a lack of regulation in a 
marketised system and question the assumptions which informed the introduction of health care reforms.  
Introducing competitive structures when there are a limited number of providers may result in a monopoly 
situation which does not bring benefits for service users.  A lack of expertise to in commissioning and 
contracting has affected the quality of decisions made by the public sector in relation to the private sector.  
The influence of the private sector on the health care policy process is only recently becoming a topic for 
research.  
 
Reduced access to health/ participation in decisions 
Studies of Central and Eastern Europe, which have examined how health sector reforms have impacted on 
health systems, frequently point out the lack of public participation in the decisions about changing funding 
systems and the problems that this has caused.  This is in addition to the introduction of indirect payments 
which affect the access to health care of the poorest groups 
 
Commentary on types of research 
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The nature of academic research is that although research methodologies may be made explicit, this does 
not mean that academic studies are free from value bias.  The dominance of a neoliberal model can be 
identified in many health sector reform studies.  Sources of funding can influence research studies, in terms 
of the topics researched and the methodologies used.   
 
The concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and equity have been used in the context of health sector reforms 
as a way of justifying changes in health care systems.  Several of these concepts have been drawn from 
research into private sector manufacturing or service industries.  The use of the model of SERVQUAL is 
often used in many studies of hospital and health care efficiency, which is a model developed for services 
providers in the private sector.  It measures customer satisfaction through five dimensions: 
1. Tangibles - physical facilities, equipment, staff appearance, etc. 
2. Reliability - ability to perform service dependably and accurately 
3. Responsiveness - willingness to help and respond to customer need 
4. Assurance - ability of staff to inspire confidence and trust 
5. Empathy - the extent to which caring individualised service is given 
(Source: Buttle, 1996) 
It is subject to several critiques in relation to its use in the private sector.  One of the main criticisms is that 
SERVQUAL measures customer satisfaction by a comparison of the expectations and perceptions of 
customers.  The emphasis is on perception rather than actual experience, so is more of a measurement of 
attitude rather satisfaction with service (Buttle, 2004).     The essence of good quality health care is not fully 
captured by these measures because the long term effectiveness of treatment and care, as measured 
through health outcomes.  
 
Although there is a large number of research articles published on issues such as health sector reform, a 
review of the research methodologies used show a mix of historical analysis, policy analysis and 
stakeholder analysis techniques are drawn on.   A broader observation about many research studies into 
health sector reform is that because many of the studies are about policy implementation, the research 
that they are based on can range from a systematic study of key informants at different levels, gathered 
through interviews and document analysis, to a narrative account of reforms, gathered through a series of 
secondary sources.   
 
2 Methodology 
 
As many studies of the effects of privatisation of health services are qualitative, it is important to find a 
methodology which can deal with these studies at a meta-level.  Meta- synthesis is a “systematic approach 
used for the collection and analysis of qualitiative methods to synthesise these findings” (Lindhal, et al, 
2010: 455).  This is a method which is appropriate for combining, comparing and contrasting qualitative 
studies.   McCormick et al (2003) found that the use of meta- synthesis in the field of health care research 
led to a greater understanding of socio-political processes that influence health care.  This is significant for 
an analysis of studies of health care privatisation. 
 
Screening 
Once a range of studies had been identified for each framework element, the studies were clustered on the 
basis of a series of common denominators:   
 Nature of process / issues, for example, decentralisation, informal payments, labour 
 Study type – quantitative or qualitative;  
 Country (low and high income), region or service;  
These clusters of studies were then assessed in terms of the problems in synthesizing the existing findings 
due to:  
 Differences in theoretical/ analytical approaches;  
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 Forms of measurement;  
 Reporting quality of studies.   
This process of screening led to some clustering of studies, which were subject to a form of meta-analysis 
or meta-synthesis, depending on whether they used quantitative or qualitative research techniques.    
 
Post-screening stages - meta-synthesis 
The approach to meta-synthesis has been informed by the use of two methods: Systematic Descriptive 
Maps and Narrative Empirical Synthesis, which have enabled the research from a range of qualitative 
studies to be reviewed and prepared for further synthesis.   These methods are explained below. 
 
Systematic descriptive maps draw together qualitative studies by providing a description of research in a 
specific topic area.  It provides a way of interpreting the results of the synthesis including identifying the 
need for further research  (Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI-
Centre), 2011).  This approach has been used to develop two reviews of informal payments and reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Narrative Empirical Synthesis brings together the results of empirical research that are in a narrative form 
to form a structured narrative or series of summary tables. Results from a range of different types of 
empirical research can be synthesised in this way, including experimental evaluative research and survey 
research (Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre), 2011).  This 
approach has been used to develop meta-synthesis reviews of decentralisation and labour.  
 
The results of the grouping of studies show the following topics emerged: 
 Decentralisation; 
 Indirect payments; 
 Central and Eastern Europe; 
 Labour; 
 Effectiveness of public and private health care sectors. 
 Case studies: 
 Social care – privatisation of a public service 
 South Africa 
 Brazil 
 Malaysia 
 
A review of each topic is now presented. 
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3 Decentralisation 
 
Although local decision-making shaped the development of municipal and local government in many 
countries, decentralisation policies have been a dominant form of public sector reform or New Public 
Management.  International agencies have played an important role in promoting decentralisation reforms.  
Decentralisation has been an essential part of many health sector reform programmes and one of the 
conditionalities associated with World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans.   Health care 
financial reforms play an additional role in shaping the impact of decentralisation.  In Latin America and 
Africa, health care decentralisation characterised health sector reforms in the 1990s.   In China, a wider 
process of administrative decentralisation introduced in 1978, has impacted on the health care system.  
Decentralisation has also be adopted by high income countries, such as Finland and  Denmark, introduced 
changes that moved decision making to municipal level, which have  affected the planning and delivery of 
health care services.   
 
There are many factors that influence the process of health care decentralisation.  The reality of 
implementing decentralisation has often been more complex that expected because of a lack of capacity at 
local level (Litvak et al, 1998).   In many countries it has played a key role in an overall process of 
marketisation and privatisation.  Rondinelli (1983), in an often quoted article, published when working at 
the World Bank, defines decentralisation as involving four stages: 
1. Deconcentration – transfer of responsibility to a lower administrative level;  
2. Delegation - transfer of responsibility to a lower organisational level; 
3. Devolution – transfer of authority to lower political level; 
4. Privatisation – transfer of control from public to private sector.   
In this model, the term decentralisation covers several administrative scenarios and eventually leads to 
privatisation.   The multi-faceted nature of decentralisation has made it difficult to evaluate its impact.  The 
rationale for health care decentralisation covers a wide range of factors, such as improvements in technical 
efficiency, resource allocation, innovation, equity, quality of services, accountability as well as empowering 
local governments (Saltman et al, 2007: 18).   
 
Approaches to research 
Decentralisation has been introduced in many regions with different administrative systems, for example, 
Africa, Latin America, Central/East Europe, China.  Research, often undertaken since 1990, in Africa, Latin 
America and Europe, has approached health care decentralisation by examining the implementation 
process and identifying the problems that have emerged as a result. Case studies, which examine a region 
or sub-region, are one of the most frequently used approaches. Many of the studies use a policy analysis 
framework.   Key informant interviews and focus groups explore the views of officials at central and local 
government levels as well health care practitioners and managers, with little input from users.  Some 
studies focus specifically on the effect of decentralisation on health workers.      
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Decentralisation studies reviewed  
 
Study and country Data collection 
Maluka SO, Hurtig AK, Sebastián MS, 
Shayo E, Byskov J, Kamuzora P. (2010) 
Decentralization and health care 
prioritization process in Tanzania: from 
national International Journal of  Health 
Planning & Management 2010 Jul 5. 
[Epub ahead of print] 
A case study of Mbarali district in Tanzania uses a policy 
analysis approach analyses the implementation of 
decentralized health care priority setting. The case study is 
informed by a review of documents, key informant interviews, 
focus group discussion, and notes from non-participant 
observation. 
Wyss K, Lorenz N. (2000) 
Decentralization and central and 
regional coordination of health services: 
the case of Switzerland International 
Journal of Health Planning & 
Management 15(2): 103–114. 
Case study of decentralisation and central coordination of 
health services in Switzerland. 
Lloyd-Sherlock P. (2005) Health sector 
reform in Argentina: a cautionary tale. 
Social Science and Medicine 60 (8), 
1893–1903. 
Case study of health sector reform in Argentina. 
 
Hakkinen U. (2005) The impact of 
changes in Finland’s health care system 
Health Economics 14: S101–S118  
Case study of decentralisation of health financing. 
Jeppsson A. 2001. Financial priorities 
under decentralization in Uganda. 
Health Policy & Planning 16: 187–192. 
Interviews were held with government officials, focus groups 
with officials and politicians in Uganda.  The fiscal choice model 
was used to analyse choices made at local government level 
about own resources as well as central government transfers.  
Sakyi E. K. (2008) Implementing 
decentralised management in Ghana 
The experience of the Sekyere West 
District health administration Leadership 
in Health Services  21(4): 307-319 
A qualitative exploratory case study approach was used to 
examine the barriers to the implementation of management 
decentralisation of health services and programmes at district 
level in Ghana, Sekyere West district. 
Saide MAO, Stewart DE. (2001) 
Decentralization and human resource 
management in the health sector: a case 
study (1996–1998) from Nampula 
province, Mozambique. International 
Journal of Health Planning & 
Management 16: 155–168 
Case study informed by interviews with provincial managers in 
Mozambique.  A literature review informed the design of semi-
structured interviews.  
Wilton P.  & Smith R.D. (1998) Primary 
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149-166 
Analysis of three country GP budget holding 
Mayhew S. M. (2003)  The Impact of 
Decentralisation on Sexual and 
Reproductive Health Services in Ghana 
Reproductive Health Matters  11(21): 
74-87 
A multiple-level qualitative case study undertaken in Ghana 
between 1996–98 with follow-up visits made in 1999 and 2002. 
The research involved a variety of methods, including policy 
analysis, document analysis, key informant and semi-structured 
interviews with policymakers, donors, managers, service 
providers and service users.  
Saltman R.B. Bankauskaite V. Vrangbaek 
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A series of papers exploring decentralisation in health care in 
Europe 
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Research question 
 How has decentralisation affected the marketisation of health care?  
 
Emerging themes 
The review of national case studies show that, even after taking national differences into consideration, 
there are a series of processes associated with decentralisation, which are part of marketisation.  These 
are:  
a) Central funding reductions;  
b) Self-management of hospitals;  
c) Changes in position of health workers;    
d) Trends towards re-centralisation.   
 
a) Reductions in central government funding 
Changes in health care funding arrangements are often an integral part of a decentralisation policy and 
influence how it is implemented.  Traditionally, in centralised systems, funding for hospitals comes from 
national or central government.  The extent to which central funding is transferred or taken away from 
hospitals and local health services has an impact on the quality of services and on ways in which these 
services are managed.  There are several scenarios which are drawn from specific national experiences. 
 
In Uganda, the effect of financial decentralisation led to increased tension between local authorities which 
were allowed to allocate resources according to their own priorities, which were initially assumed to fit into 
national priorities.   The actual results showed that local authorities did not prioritise primary health care as 
much as the national government expected (Jeppsson, 2002).  It also showed that local authority views of 
health care were often negative, seeing healthcare as labour intensive and expensive.  The lack of 
recognition of overall national goals by local decision-makers has implications for overall healthcare 
inequalities in the country.   
 
In Georgia, after the introduction of health care decentralisation, hospitals were only reimbursed on a fee 
per case basis for approved items of the basic benefit package.  For services not on the basic benefit 
package, providers were allowed to charge fees and were also allowed to keep money from fees (Atun, 
2007).  If central funding is removed, hospitals have to find a way of replacing the funding.  The assumption 
is that either local authorities take responsibility by raising revenue through local taxes, or hospitals will be 
expected to generate income from the sale of services. Hospitals then generate income through the 
imposition of co-payments or user fees on service users.   
 
In Argentina, the policy of health care decentralisation created self-managed hospitals, designed to be part 
of hospital networks, which linked public and private providers in a system of universal coverage (Lloyd-
Sherlock, 2005).  These measures were aimed at reducing provincial government influence over the health 
system, although there were varying degrees of implementation, with provincial governments retaining 
some control.  Health insurers were to pay hospitals for the treatment received by patients but at the same 
time the system of health insurance was being reformed and opened to competition, with an expansion of 
private health insurance companies.   This had a negative impact on hospital incomes at a time when 
hospitals were becoming self-managing and supposedly asserting themselves against provincial authorities.  
 
It is not just the removal of central funding that can affect health services but the form in which central 
government funding is given to local health services.   In Finland, a central government grant, which 
previously covered all specific costs of health services, was replaced in 1993 by a block grant which was 
supposed to cover the cost of local health services (Hakkinen, 2005).  In the previous system, subsidies 
were related to real costs but in the new system, municipalities were given lump sums, which were not 
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allocated to specific services (non ring-fenced) and were calculated prospectively using a specific need- 
based capitation formula.  The aim was to reduce government control and increase local influence over the 
provision of services.  Municipal authorities expanded their purchaser/ commissioner role as purchaser of 
services and reduced their provider responsibilities.  They could purchase from public, private and not-for-
profit providers and were allowed to contract out existing public services.  As a result of the changes in the 
way that central funding was allocated, the revenue from central government declined and municipal 
authorities had to increase municipal taxes for health care.  This was accompanied by an increase in user 
charges for municipal health services.  Households contributed an increased percentage of health care 
financing (Hakkinen, 2005; Koivusalo et al 2007).   
 
Another form of financial decentralisation is GP fundholding, where GP or primary care doctors are 
responsible for the budget to commission and purchase health care services for a specific group of patients 
(Wilton & Smith, 1998).  Schemes have been implemented in several countries.  The importance of looking 
at the experience of the GP fundholding model is that it can be seen as part of a process that leads to 
‘managed care’, as practiced in the United States, which depends on systems of limiting ‘managing’ health 
care according to funding available.  A locally based GP fundholding arrangement is a useful basis for 
setting up managed care.  
 
In a review of the UK, New Zealand and United States (US), Wilton & Smith (1998) found that there were 
some significant differences between these three countries but some similarities.   
There were differences between the three countries in terms of size of budget and the size of population 
that GP fundholders were responsible for.  In the US, Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) are a form 
of GP fundholding but the GP is a gatekeeper to health care and is strongly motivated to keep expenditure 
within certain limits.  The HMO takes the financial risk for provision of services and integrates health 
insurance with the provision of medical services.  Payment is made on a capitation basis, rather than fee for 
service.  In 1998, HMOs had larger budgets and were responsible for larger numbers of people than either 
the UK or New Zealand.  Although the US showed some cost containment benefits, there were additional 
administrative and operational costs involved in the process of fundholding.   
 
There were differences between the three countries in terms of what budgets were spent on and whether 
payments were made on a capitation basis or fee for service.   In New Zealand, GP fundholders had set up 
independent practice associations (IPAs) and other umbrella organisations which acted  as budget holders 
rather than individual practices holding a budget.  Membership of the IPAs was not restricted to GPs, with 
specialists, midwives and other health professionals involved, making a broader based decisionmaking 
process.    In the case of the UK, GP fundholding was restricted to specific GP practices and was not opened 
up to other stakeholders in the health care system.  
 
New systems of health care financing or changes in the system of allocating central government funds can 
lead to a process of marketisation because of a reduction in resources. Smaller budgets force hospitals and 
local authorities to find alternative sources of funding.  User fees and increased levels of local taxation are 
two options.  Health care services may be contracted out as a way of reducing expenditure.  The 
introduction of contracting out and user fees are considered solutions to shortages in funding because they 
are expected to lead to improved efficiency and better use of resources.  There has been no consideration 
of what a successful market arrangement is based on or the type ofrent-seeking behaviour which will be 
adopted by hospitals and private practitioners in the health care system.   
 
b) Self-managing hospitals 
Reforms of health care funding may be accompanied by legislative changes that convert public sector 
hospitals into self-managing entities.  These have different names in national health systems, for example 
state social enterprises, foundation trusts, self-managed hospitals.  Frequently these new organisations 
have a legal status, ownership of assets and autonomy.  Although established by legislation, the hospitals 
may take time to be formally established and fully operational.   
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The case of China will be used to show how a policy of decentralisation led to changes in local hospital 
management and privatisation.   China introduced decentralisation in 1978 and in almost thirty years of 
implementation shows how the process of privatisation resulted from the consequences of 
decentralisation.  The following case study shows how the health care system has been affected. 
 
The introduction of decentralisation in China (Yanzhong, 2004) has had an impact on the resource base 
available for health care institutions.  Provinces and localities are no longer given central government 
funding.  Central government now only funds national hospitals, research institutions and medical schools, 
which it controls directly.  In 1989, hospitals, at local level, had to become self-sufficient because central 
government funding was stopped.   Local authorities were supposed to provide funding through local 
taxation.  Tang & Bloom (2000) found, in a case study of a province that devolved finance and management 
of basic health services, that resources were not effectively mobilised.  This affected the way in which 
hospitals operated  (Blumenthal Hsiao 2005).  
 
Hospitals had to sell services in order to generate income. Each department had to work towards targets 
and doctors were paid a basic salary and a bonus if targets were achieved.   This was not formal 
government policy but the practice was ignored by central government, an example of how policies can 
evolve through neglect rather than through a set of positive decisions.  Strict price regulation of many 
health services continued but prices for drugs, new tests, and technology were uncontrolled (Blumenthal 
Hsiao, 2005).  As doctors were under pressure to generate income, there has been an expansion in high 
technology expensive treatments and pharmaceuticals.  Although not technically legal, some hospitals have 
leased or contracted units to external interests (Tam, 2010).  This, accompanied by the wider changes 
taking place in health care, can be described as a form of privatisation (Blumenthal Hsiao, 2005).   
 
The impact of hospitals becoming income generating has restricted access to health care to higher income 
groups.  The combination of making local authorities responsible for funding and the introduction of user 
fees, has led to increased health inequalities at local and regional level.   Agricultural cooperatives have 
been privatised which destroyed the cooperative medical system and reduced resources available for 
health care.  Hospitals facilities have been reduced and are of poorer quality.  The reduction in local 
government spending has been matched by increased household spending on health care.   
 
These extensive changes took place before local authorities started to sell hospitals in 2000. More hospitals 
were sold by the poorer local authorities because the sale of hospitals reduced their financial 
responsibilities.   By 2010, only a minority of hospitals have been privatised but the majority of state owned 
hospitals operate as corporate entities, almost as for-profit hospitals (Tam 2010).  There is a lack of 
regulatory institutions to control the expansion of corporate state hospitals.  Tang & Bloom (2000) found 
no increase in resources from local government and that effectiveness, efficiency and equity were not 
addressed.   
 
The move from extensive state provision of health care to a more limited set of services, with increased out 
of pocket payments, has eventually led to central government starting to take action.  With only 28% of the 
population covered by health insurance, the government has introduced mandatory insurance and a new 
rural cooperative medical scheme  in 2002, which is funded by household contributions and central/ local 
government subsidies.  However, attempts to de-privatise the health care system have been hampered by 
a lack of resources.  Making changes to a more commercialised system of health care is difficult because 
government support to hospitals is still limited (Tam 2010). 
  
There is a growing body of evidence to show that self management of hospitals inevitably lead to the 
introduction of user charges.  The case of China shows how privatisation can result from decentralisation 
even if there is no coherent policy of privatisation promoted by the government.  It also shows how difficult 
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it is to change a commercialised system back to a more collective system because of a lack of government 
resources. 
  
c) Changes in the position of health care workers 
Health care decentralisation has a profound effect on health care workers.  Decentralisation is influenced 
by public sector reforms, which aim to change working practices, recruitment, retention and pay.  The local 
determination of pay is one of the most controversial aspects of health care decentralisation, which is 
linked directly to the self-management of hospitals.  In some countries, national governments have 
retained control of health workers but in other countries, responsibility for recruitment and employment 
was moved to local level.  As health care is a labour intensive activity, control over health workers shapes 
how the reforms develop.  In Argentina, national government retained control over staffing because it was 
a source of patronage (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2005).  In Georgia, health care workers were taken off the payroll 
when hospitals became self-managing.  In Uganda, local authorities became responsible for some groups of 
health care workers (Jeppsson,2001). 
 
Although the research into the effects of decentralisation on health workers has been mainly focused on 
the impact on human resource management, several studies have attempted to assess how 
decentralisation affects the professionalisation of workers.  Kyaddondo & Whyte (2003) in Uganda found 
that health workers, at local level, were on several different pay rolls, which were the responsibility of 
either central government, local/ district authorities or health facilities. This led to staff being on different 
pay, terms and conditions.   Staff at health facilities, who were paid from user fees, often experienced 
fluctuations in pay, determined by the monthly income from user fees.  Workers reported low pay, late 
payment of wages and in some cases non-payment.  After decentralisation health workers were unclear 
about who to complain about non-payment of wages.  They had lost central government allowances that 
were no longer paid by local authorities.  This led to a reduced income. New districts were often unable to 
fund training, which affected the ability of health workers to improve their professional position and 
career. 
 
In decentralised systems in Africa, management arrangements became more complex because members of 
health unit management committees were supposed to manage the work of health facilities and health 
workers but health workers felt that they were not qualified to do this.  They felt that their own status in 
the community was reduced.  The closer arrangements with community leaders could also draw health 
workers into local political issues which many felt could affect their careers (Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003).  
Many responded by becoming involved in private clinics or drug shops to increase their income, which 
contributed to the process of privatisation. 
 
Decentralisation can also affect the ability of regions to recruit health care staff.  Mayhew (2003) in a study 
of reproductive health service in Ghana, found that the poorest regions had the least resources available to 
attract staff.  They were unable to increase salaries so could only offer housing.  Workers in poorest 
districts want to move on for career reasons and to improve working conditions, leading to a high rate of 
turnover.  
 
In Mozambique, health care decentralization was introduced in 1987, as part of a structural adjustment 
policy (SAP).  Human resource functions were decentralised to the principal governor, who could delegate 
responsibilities to provincial directors.  Although it was widely recognised that high quality primary health 
care needed skilled and experienced health workers, many problems emerged in the management of 
health workers and distribution of health workers, caused by a lack of attention to human resource issues.  
This was due to a lack of human resource and financial management capacity at local level.  Inter-
governmental and inter-agency coordination developed slowly.  Community participation was weakened 
because of lack of health workers (Saide & Stewart, 2001).   
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Even in countries, with highly developed human resource management systems, health care 
decentralisation has led to problems for health workers.  In Finland, since decentralisation, there has been 
an increase in doctors and nurses but a decrease in less well qualified health workers in specialised 
services.   Dissatisfaction with working conditions and salaries of municipal health workers has led to 
shortages of staff (Hakkinen, 2005). 
 
Several studies show that health care decentralisation has affected the respect, value and integrity of 
health workers.  Inadequate management systems can lead to a lack of respect for health workers.  
Reductions in salaries, not only reduce the status but also the integrity of workers because they have to 
find alternative sources of income.  This might be through a second job in the private sector or by 
introducing informal payments for health care.   This is part of a process of individualisation which replaces 
a ‘public sector ethos’ with an individual form of motivation, putting private interests before public goals.    
(See section on informal payments) 
 
d) Role of central state and increased health inequalities 
A relatively early study of evidence from decentralisation reforms showed that equity across regions is 
often reduced after the introduction of decentralisation (Klugman, 1994).    There is now a growing body of 
experience from European countries, that show that the long term effects of health care decentralisation, 
whilst being positive in terms of responsiveness to local needs can also lead to increasing health 
inequalities.  Switzerland has had a longstanding decentralised health care system at canton level with a 
limited federal health care policy.  Wyss and Lorenz,(2000) found that the system has led to an unequal 
distribution of resources.  Any attempts at national investment in resources have limited scope with the 
existing federal system.  Finland, which introduced health care decentralisation in 1994, has also found that 
safeguards are needed for disadvantaged groups particularly people with mental health issues.  A balance 
between different levels of care and different forms financing needs to be ensured (Koivusalo et al, 2007).  
 
During almost two decades, the experience of many countries in Central and Eastern Europe has shown 
that there is a need for central government to play a role in regulation and standard setting.    National 
legislation and policies are needed to direct reform.  It is not enough to allow decentralisation without 
central government overview.  National systems of regulation and standardised processes of 
reimbursement are needed if there are to be accessible minimum standards of health care across a 
country, especially within a market context.  Market arrangements may operate in different ways within 
local circumstances. 
 
 
Key points 
 Reforms to health care financing often lead to reduced funding for health care at 
local level 
 Reductions in funding lead to adoption of user fees and informal payments 
 Self management of hospitals introduces income generation through user fees and 
co-payments 
 The status and integrity of health workers are affected by decentralisation 
 Recent experiences in many countries are showing the need for a process of re-
centralisation to ensure health equity 
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4 Informal payments, user fees and co-payments 
 
Informal payments, user fees or co-payments for health care are part of a process of privatisation because 
individuals have to pay directly for health care rather than accessing public health care, free at the point of 
access.  Payment for health care may be part of a government health care policy but it may be adopted 
informally by individual health care facilities or health workers.  It has an impact on the relationship 
between patient and health care worker because it introduces a commercialised element to the 
relationship. 
 
There are a range of terms, informal payments, user fees or co-payments, which cover different 
arrangements, which may vary from country to country.  Several types of payments will be discussed in this 
section.  In a review of research on informal payments for care in countries of transition economies, 
informal payments were defined as “cost contributions, including supplies and salaries, misuse of market 
position and payments for additional services” (Ensor, 2004).    Informal payments are payments which 
have to be made by the service user in order to receive treatment or, in some cases, are made at the end of 
a successful treatment.   
 
User fees or co-payments are often official fees that have to be paid at some point of the treatment 
process.  They may cover the cost of medicines or the reason for payment may be less specific.  Decisions 
are made about user fees at national or local level and this often determined what the income from user 
fees is used for.  It is the use of the income of informal payments or user fees that has some influence on 
patients’ attitudes to making the payments.  For payments that are paid directly to a health worker and 
obviously is of benefit only to that health worker, payment is made because there is no other option.  For 
fees that are used for the health care facility, the service user may be more sympathetic.  SOURCE 
 
The significance of informal payments/user fees is how they affect access to services.  They can also be a 
symptom of corruption in a health care system.  Corruption is defined as the “use of public office for private 
gains” (Ensor & Duran-Moreno, 2002).  A better understanding of user fees and informal payments 
provides an insight into one form of corruption that characterises the health care sector, which has 
followed a form of privatisation, in some countries.  They have emerged as a result of health care reforms 
in former socialist countries, where health workers have low wages, paid irregularly. 
 
There are several types of user fees.  Under-the-counter payments are made individually by the patient to a 
health worker/ profession for a service.  User fees are usually made to the health facility for a drugs, 
materials, food and nursing services.  These contribute to a patient receiving a better treatment. In practice 
under-the-counter payments and user fees are difficult to identify as two separate processes.   Some health 
workers and doctors distinguish between payments before treatment and gifts for treatment received.  If a 
patient is having a series of treatments then this separation can become unclear.   
 
Research 
Several studies have used qualitative research methods to explore how both health workers and patients 
respond to informal payments and how it influences access to health care.   
The growth of informal payments in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, have often started by 
exploring the historical basis to informal payments.  This historical approach helps to place informal 
payments in an economic, cultural and social context.  This is also a significant factor in understanding 
attitudes to informal payments and user fees in Africa. 
 
Table:  Informal payments, user fees and co-payments studies 
 
Study and country  Data collection 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
9 September 2011  Page 19 of 82 
Balabanova D. Mc Kee M. 
(2002) Understanding 
informal payments for health 
care: the example of Bulgaria 
2002 Health Policy 62:  243–
273 
Data were derived from a national representative survey of 1547 
individuals complemented by in-depth interviews and focus groups with 
over 100 respondents, conducted in Bulgaria in 1997.. 
Belli P. Gotsadze G. Shahriari 
H. (2004) Out-of-pocket and 
informal payments in health 
sector: evidence from 
Georgia Health Policy 70:  
109–123 
In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with users as well as 
providers. 
Liaropoulos L. Siskou O. 
Kaitelidou D. Theodorou M. 
Katostaras T.  (2008) 
Informal payments in public 
hospitals in Greece  Health 
Policy 87:  72–81 
randomized countrywide sample of 1616 households, amounting to 4738 
individuals. The survey methodology 
was telephone interviews with a questionnaire supported by the software 
of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
Falkingham J. (2004) Poverty, 
out-of-pocket payments and 
access to health care: 
evidence fromTajikistan 
Social Science & Medicine 58 
247–258 
Use of the Tajikistan Livings Standard Survey to investigate the level and 
distribution of out-of-pocket payments for health care in Tajikistan and to 
examine the extent to which such payments act as barriers to health-care 
access. 
Thompson R. & Witter S. 
(2000) Informal payments in 
transitional economies: 
implications for health sector 
reform International Journal 
of Health Planning & 
Management 15: 169-187  
Draws on evidence from recent published studies and key informant 
interviews, examines the factors that influence informal payment 
systems in state health facilities in the Former Soviet Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Mæstad O. Mwisongo A. 
(2011) Informal payments 
and the quality of health 
care: Mechanisms revealed 
by Tanzanian health workers 
Health Policy 99: 107–115 
Study informed by data drawn from eight focus groups with 58 health 
workers representing different cadres and levels of care in one rural and 
one urban district in Tanzania. 
Owuso F.  (2005) Livelihood 
strategies and performance 
of Ghana’s health & 
education sectors Public 
Administration & 
Development  25: 157-174 
 
Data for the study are drawn from fieldwork conducted between 1995 and 
1996 in Wenchi and Techiman in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana and 
supplemented with information from the 1991–1992 Ghana Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS). Interviews also were conducted with officials at 
the Ministries of Health and Education at the national and district levels. In 
addition, heads of selected public and private organisations, current and 
retired employees and service users in Wenchi and Techiman were 
interviewed using structured questionnaires and focus-group discussions. 
 
Research questions 
 How do user fees/ co-payments/ informal payments influence the process of privatisation? 
 What impact do user fees/ co-payments/ informal payments have on corruption? 
 
Themes emerging 
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The review of a series of studies which have interviewed both health workers and service users about the 
impact of fees and informal payments show that there are several reforms that create an environment 
where payments for health care are introduced.  These are discussed in three sections: 
 Events leading to informal payments and user fees 
 Perceptions of informal payments and user fees 
 Health worker perspectives. 
 
a) Events leading to informal payments and user fees 
User fees or informal payments may follow the legal introduction of fees or they may result from the low 
pay of health care workers.  In Central and Eastern Europe, there has been an increase in the use of 
informal payments and co-payments for health care since the introduction of health sector reforms after 
1990.  Several factors influence the introduction of informal payments and user fees.  Reduction of funding 
for government health care may result in health workers being paid erratically.  The introduction of 
legislation that makes it legal for health care practitioners to operate as private practitioners and charge 
fees introduces the concept of fees into the health care system.     
 
In Georgia, the right to free health care was abolished in 1995.  Public health insurance was limited to 
services included in a basic benefit package.  It became legal for practitioners to charge fees.  What had 
been a centrally planned system was converted into an internal market.  The State Medical Insurance 
Company, Municipal Health Funds and the Public Health Department (PHD) became purchasers and 
commissioners of health care services.  Hospitals became independent organisations which were 
reimbursed on a fee per case basis for approved items of the basic benefit package.  Health staff were 
removed from the payroll.  For services not included in the basic benefit package, providers were allowed 
to charge fees and were also allowed to keep money from fees (Belli et al, 2004)   In Georgia, fees had  
existed before 1989 but became more significant after 1990 as incomes fell for the majority of the 
population, both health workers and patients. 
 
In Tajikistan, reduced health expenditure has resulted in increased household expenditure on health care 
through under-the-counter payments and informal payments. There is a cultural tradition of giving gifts 
after treatment but this is changing because of the need to pay more fees for treatment because of 
declining government health budgets.   Although health care is technically still free, some health care 
organisations are now allowed to charge fees.  Hospitals are also allowed to charge fees for an approved 
list of services, as defined by the Ministry of Health (Falkingham, 2004).    
 
As well as official charges, there is a growing use of informal payments.  Health workers are one of the 
lowest paid groups in Tajikistan and charge informal payments to increase income.  Salaries in the public 
sector, as well as being low, are often paid late and in arrears.  It is difficult to distinguish informal, formal 
and payments for drugs.  Lower income groups report lower levels of health problems and lower rates of 
health service use.  When they do need care, cost of care can be a barrier to access.   For hospital care, the 
families of patients are often taking on the responsibilities of bathing, feeding and even injections and 
giving drugs (Falkingham, 2004).   
 
User fees in Africa were introduced as a result of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s.   The research 
over several decades shows that user fees affected access to services as well as the attitude of service users 
to public health care services in general (Palmer, et al, 2004).   As with informal payments in former 
socialist countries, user fees were a mix of official policy and a result of low pay for health workers.  
Historically, public health services had been free in many countries but mission hospitals often charged a 
small fee.  This was often accepted because mission hospitals were considered to provide better quality 
services.  
 
b) Perceptions 
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 In Greece, a national health system was set up in 1983 to increase access but funding is partly through 
national taxation, social insurance and private payments.  Private insurance cover is low.  Out of pocket 
payments form 41% of health expenditure.  36% of users of hospitals had paid at least one informal 
payment.  Of these respondents, 19% considered informal payments as extra fees and 17% reported 
informal payments as a voluntary “tip or gratuity” (Liaropoulos et al (2008).  Few doctors refused the 
payments and few patients refused to pay.  Many informal payments were due to access problems with 
admission times being restricted or having to negotiate access through a hospital administrator.  
Educational or income levels were not related to use of informal payments so poor patients are also 
expected to pay.  Patients were found to be more likely to pay for surgery than non-surgical interventions.   
 
Informal payments also influence the type of care that people are able to access.  There is a high rate of 
caesarean sections in Greek hospitals with 60% of women having them in both public and private hospitals 
but Roma women and immigrant women have much lower rates (5% and 7%), which constitute  60% of 
caesarean sections in public hospitals (Liaropoulos, 2008).   Whether fees are felt to be voluntary or 
compulsory determined to extent to which users were put off using health services as a result of having to 
pay fees.  Compulsory fees are more likely to make patients consider whether they could afford health 
care.   Informal payments are related to an inadequate public system rather than cultural reasons. 
 
In Bulgaria, user fees, although illegal before 1989, were allowed for low paid medical workers.  Since 1989, 
the use of informal payments had become more widespread.   
There was also some impression that the money needed for payments was scarcer than before 1989.  
People’s incomes had been reduced so that making a gift was more difficult.    Cash payments were 
considered to have greater influence then in-kind payments (flowers, chocolates, coffee) ( Daskalova et al, 
2005). The government has an ambiguous approach to users fees and informal payments.  There was some 
partial recognition with Decree for the Conditions and Procedure for Payment for Health Care of Patient’s 
Choice in December 1997, which outlined which services were eligible for a fee.  Since 1989, informal fees 
and payments have increased (Babanova & McKee, 2002).    
 
Georgia, about 70-80% of health expenditure is generated through formal and informal user fees.  Fees are 
paid for services which are part of the basic benefits package (BPP) and which are not part of this package.  
Health workers also ask for fees explicitly.  Sometime fees may be negotiated at a rate below the official 
price and so patient will benefit for direct payment.  This will mean the money does not go to the 
government (Belli et al, 2004).  This is an example of where official policy on fees can contribute to the 
health worker working for their own individual interest   In Georgia, there is a tradition of giving a gift as a 
form of gratitude for successful treatment.    
 
In decentralised systems, the guidelines for user fees may be unclear although there is an expectation that 
institutions are income generating.  Governments may overlook that practice (Thompson & Witter, 2000).  
Patients are often unaware of whether they are paying informal payments or formal fees.  Thompson & 
Witter (2000) identify several factors that influence informal payments: traditions of giving gifts for health 
care; poor formal salaries of health workers; availability of supplies and quality of services.  If there is a 
successful private sector, the incidence of informal payments may be limited but if there is no formal 
private sector, informal may expand.  In this sense, the use of informal payments by health workers is an 
example of privatisation but can be described as an informal sector. 
 
Respondents, in Bulgaria, reported that they were more likely to pay in gift or in kind rather than cash.  
They were more likely to make informal payments in surgery and obstetrics in hospitals in urban areas.  
Doctors or surgeons were most likely to benefit from informal payments. Cash payments and gifts are 
presented at different stages in treatment. In Bulgaria, higher income patients were more likely to make 
informal payments (Daskalova et al, 2005). 
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In Poland, by 1999, there was no effective choice of insurer so regional funds had a monopoly.   The 
reimbursement system was on a capitation basis so that there was an incentive for doctors to limit 
patients.  Patients could either wait for treatment for pay a fee to have private health care.  At least a third 
of patients paying for services were technically covered by insurance (Filinson et al,2003). 
 
c) Health workers perspective 
In many countries, experiencing health sector reforms, salaries of health workers have fallen and are often 
paid infrequently.  In extreme cases, health workers have been taken off the central government payroll 
and have to generate salaries themselves.  Lack of salaries or low salaries force health workers to ask for 
informal payments in order to live.  This was felt to alter the relationship between doctor and patient.   
 
Some people felt that user fees were part of a longer tradition.  Health workers had different attitudes to 
user fees. Some felt they were unethical but others were more accepting of the practice.  A third group felt 
that presents or gifts were acceptable as long as they were voluntary (Daskalova et al, 2005) . 
 
In Tanzania, health workers receive payments in different contexts.  These may affect the relationship 
between health workers and patient and the delivery of patient care.  In 1993, user fees were introduced in 
public health care facilities for a wide range of services.  Fees are used to reduce waiting time, as charges 
for previously ‘free’ services, when there are shortages of drugs, for a private pharmacy in a hospital, and 
as gifts for successful treatment (Mæstad & Mwisongo, 2011).   
 
A recent survey in Tanzania found that it is difficult assess how much health workers are paid from informal 
payments as it varies from place to place.  However, the survey found that there was a relationship 
between informal payments and quality of services.  If informal payments are linked to a higher quality of 
service and to corruption, then health workers who do not ask for informal payments, may reduce their 
quality of service.  In this context, corruption may contribute to better quality of services in some cases 
(Mæstad & Mwisongo,  2011).  In whatever scenario, informal payments upset relationships between 
service users and health workers.  They also impact on relationships between health workers. 
 
Informal payments have also been researched as a way of understanding the livelihood strategies used by 
public sector workers.  In Ghana, workers have been involved in livelihood strategies after the value of 
wages dropped in the 1970s.  In 1985, the Hospital Fees Regulation required the Ministry of Health to 
generate at least 15% of total recurrent expenditure.  This was an initial attempt by the government to 
reform the health sector (Waddington and Enyimayew, 1990).  The opportunities for health workers to 
increase their income came as a result of recruitment freezes, which enabled them to work overtime 
and/or convert their annual leave time into money. In 1994, overtime payments to heath sector employees 
amounted to 10% of the total expenditure. In addition, some health sector employees collected 
unauthorized fees, whilst others demanded bribes and ‘tips’ before a service was provided.  The 
percentage of people who sought public health care between 1992 and 1998 decreased by 12.8%, most 
rapidly among the poor.  There was a high level of patient dissatisfaction with the service received (Owusu, 
2005). 
 
In many African countries, which introduced user fees in the 1980s, governments have started to deliver 
free health care, often as a way of achieving the Millennium Development Goals.  A recent review of 
literature on the abolition of user fees shows that the elimination of user fees has to be implemented 
carefully if it is to increase access to services (Riddle & Morestin, 2011).  This is another indication that once 
user charges are introduced, this can change the balance of relationships within health care services.  When 
free access to services is reintroduced, careful implementation is key to success.  There has to be a political 
will, coordination between government departments, adequate human resources to deal with increased 
demand for services, and incentives to increase the support of health workers (Riddle & Morestin, 2011).   
 
Conclusions  
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How do user fees/ co-payments/ informal payments influence process of privatisation? 
What impact do user fees/ informal payments have on service delivery?  
 
Informal payments and user fees are a characteristic of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
countries of the former Soviet Union as well as many African countries. Significant stages in the process of 
introducing informal payments is the legalisation of fee charging by practitioners, which may be part of an 
opening out of the health care system to competition.  When health workers are no longer directly paid but 
placed in a position where their salary is dependent on fees collected, charging informal fees will be part of 
a survival strategy.   
 
Although the cultural context may vary, with some countries having a tradition of giving gifts to doctors 
after successful treatment, this is being superseded by a complex system of informal payments (under-the-
counter) and user fees.   Inadequate funding of the health care system is one main reason for the expansion 
of informal payments.  However, the low pay and low morale of health workers is another contributory 
factor.  This has an influence on the relationship between service user and health worker.  The ability of a 
service user to access health care is often dependent on making a payment to a health worker.  This can 
erode the sense of trust between service user and health worker.  Informal payments can be seen as a form 
of corruption, where the health worker is making a decision for their own individual benefit that is not 
necessarily for the benefit of the service user.  Informal payments are taking a growing percentage of 
household expenditure which is resulting in low income households making decisions not to access health 
care.  
   
Key points 
 A sequence of events introduces opportunities for informal payments – legal 
introduction of co-payments, income generation targets for health care facilities, 
reduction of government expenditure on health care,  low salaries for health 
workers 
 Informal payments influence whether low income service users can access health 
care services 
 Informal payments/ user fees results in increases in the  proportion of household 
expenditure spent on health care and decreases in publicly funded health care 
 Informal payments undermine the independence of the public health care sector 
and makes it subject to individual gain and corruption 
 Attempts to eliminate user fees or informal payments need political will, new 
incentives for health workers and interagency support 
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5 Central and Eastern Europe health sector reforms  
 
The experience of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union provide a series of 
case studies, which show how health care systems have moved from a state-run health care system to a 
market orientated system in just over 20 years.  This experience is significant in that it provides an 
illustration of how the processes of marketisation and privatisation can gradually change a publicly funded 
system, free at the point of access.  This review will seek to show whether there are identifiable stages in 
this process of marketisation that lead from changes in financing and administration. 
 
Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union health sector reforms 
 
Studies  Methodology and analytical approach 
Datzova B.V. (2006)  
The difficult transition to national 
health insurance in Bulgaria 
Journal of International Development 
18: 425–434 
Case study drawing on secondary sources and published surveys 
of service users 
 
Daskalova N. Tomev L. Ivanova V. 
Nikolova A. Naydenova Z. Trakieva D. 
(2005) Health care reforms and 
privatization – social and economic 
consequences case of  Bulgaria Sofia: 
Institute for social and trade union 
research 
Analysis of health reforms to outline the labour and social 
consequences for the health workers and patients of the on-
going reforms through use of : focus groups with key players in 
government and health care system; questionnaire survey of 
patients and practitioners; analysis of published statistical 
information; review of health care legislation  
 
Oswald S. Economic Transition in the 
Czech Republic : Attempts to Privatize 
the Health System  
Administration & Society 
32(3): 227-254 
Case study of Czech Republic and agency theory as theoretical 
framework 
Bonilla-Chacin M.E. & Murrugarra E. 
with Temourov M. (2005) Health Care 
during Transition and Health Systems 
Reform: Evidence from the Poorest CIS 
Countries Administration & Society 
39(4): 381-408 
A comparative synthesis of existing knowledge, developed largely 
through World Bank sector reviews, expenditure reviews and 
poverty assessments, the WHO Health for All database (HFADB), 
2 the UNICEF Trans MONEE database 3 and other country 
studies. 
Nemec J.  & Kolisnichenko N. (2006) 
Market-based health care reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe: lessons 
after ten years of change International 
Review of Administrative Sciences  
72(1):11–26 
Draws from series of country studies.  Case studies of Armenia, 
the Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine, which are drawn from a 
larger group of eight much longer and highly detailed case 
studies that also included Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Slovakia. 
Each case study carried out by a country-based scholar or team. 
Filinson R. Chmielewski P. Niklas D. 
(2003) Back to the future: Polish health 
care reform Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 36 (2003) 385–403 
A study of Polish reforms informed by interviews with key 
informants and surveys completed by administrators of the 
newly developed insurance funds and by health care workers. 
 
 
Lawson C. & Nemec J. (2003) The 
Political Economy of Slovak and Czech 
Health Policy: 1989–2000 International 
Political Science Review  24 (2): 219–
Analysis of key players and policy relationship with health 
outcomes in a comparative study of two countries. 
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235 
Nemec J. & Lawson C. (2005)  Health 
Policy in Slovakia and the Outcomes of 
Health Care Reforms: 1989-2003 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: 
Research and Practice  7(1): 49-71 
Analysis of key policy players and assessment of outcomes of 
health care reform in Slovakia, through health status, quality of 
services delivered, access to services and financial performance . 
Albrehta  T. Klazingab N. (2009) 
Privatisation of health care in Slovenia 
in the period 1992–2008 Health Policy 
90: 262–269 
 
Descriptive analyses of legal and policy documents mapping the 
situation in Slovenia against an internationally established 
taxonomy and typology of  privatisation. 
 
Research into health sector reform in this region has used several research methodologies but the majority 
of studies are case studies.  Some focus on one country, with others using a multi-country approach.  
Research to identify the impact of reforms on services users and health workers draw on survey methods 
but these are limited by available resources.   Several studies use a policy analysis approach, with 
interviews with key informants.   
 
Research questions 
 What are the key stages in the transformation of a state-run health care system to a market 
orientated system? 
 How is access to health care affected by this transformation? 
 How are health workers affected by this transformation? 
 
Emerging themes 
Until 1989, health care was free at the point of use, the state invested in training of doctors but there was 
under-funding of hospitals and equipment (Oswald, 2000).  
Countries in Central and Eastern European countries introduced health sector  
reforms after 1989 that aimed to improve access, provide choice, increased efficiency, and competition in 
health care (Albrecht, Klazinga, 2009).  Privatisation was not articulated as a specific goal.  This was in 
contrast to other sectors where privatisation of public enterprises was actively promoted.  However, the 
changes that have taken place in this region can be viewed as a transition from state-run provision of 
health care to a marketised system. 
 
A review of national and multi-country studies shows that several stages characterise the change towards a 
market orientated health system: 
 Health financing reforms; 
 Legislating for private practice; 
 Reforms in management of hospitals; 
 Payment of fees for health care and corruption; 
 
a) Health care financing 
Many countries were required to introduce a system of social insurance as part of entry into the European 
Union, but reforms in health care financing have been adopted at different times and are subject to 
political struggles.  There are several defining characteristics of social insurance systems that affect the 
control that governments have over the whole health care system.  There is growing evidence that if the 
government is the single payer for health care, it is more likely to be able to influence the health care 
system.  If there are several insurance companies paying for health care, this introduces a level of 
competition into the system.   In addition, if the government retains the power to set fee levels for health 
care reimbursements, then this provides some level of control for the government. 
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However, there is also documented experience that the success of a social insurance scheme is dependent 
on effective methods to collect contributions, an example of how implementation issues affect policy 
outcomes.  Several countries, have found that collection methods were inadequate to secure regular 
incomes from insurance funds.  In Bulgaria, the 1998 National Health Insurance Act, (and 28 regional health 
funds) introduced compulsory membership, which aimed to introduce risk pooling and medical care 
purchasing for the whole population.  However, the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) has not become 
fully operational because of delays in the collection of contributions and widespread poverty.  Out-of-
pocket payments also contributed to the failure of the NHIF to achieve risk pooling because people were 
unable to afford both contributions and out of pocket payments (Datzova 2006; Daskalova et al, 2005).    
 
Russia has also experienced problems with collection of contributions which has weakened the health care 
system.  In 1991, the law on compulsory health insurance (CHI) was passed, which set up regional insurance 
funds.  There have been problems with the collection of contributions because enterprises and regional 
administrations did not always make contributions.  Health administrators were unwilling to make 
contributions for the non-economically active population (Bonilla-Chacin et al, 2005). 
 
In the Czech Republic, a new compulsory health insurance system was set up in 1992, with a 13.5% tax on 
wages (Oswald, 2000).  Employers were to pay contributions of two-thirds and employees were to pay a 
third of the contributions.   The General Health Care Insurance Office (GHIO) replaced the national health 
care system. In 1993, legislation was passed that introduced competitive health insurers.   The Sectional 
Progressive Corporate and Other Health Insurance Act gave a legal framework for competitors, such as 
employer-backed insurance companies, to enter the health insurance market.  Some sectors set up their 
own insurance companies.  The GHIO now has 75% of the health insurance market.    The health care 
system is a ‘fee for service’ system, which is reimbursed by a third party (health insurance company).  The 
government approves the services and treatments that can be reimbursed so still retains some control over 
the system.   
 
In Slovakia, new legislation that regulated health insurance and set up 13 health insurance companies was 
introduced in 1994 (Nemec & Lawson, 2005).   As with the Czech Republic, the government sets the level of 
insurance payments in relation to wages and reimbursement rates for health providers.  Armenia set up a 
new finance system, called the State Health Agency, which operates as a third party payer.  It distributes 
the state allocations to health care facilities and takes full responsibility for the management of state 
financial resources (Nemec & Kolisnichenko, 2006) 
 
b) Legislating for private practice  
There are several legislative changes, which enable a state health care system to become a marketised 
system.  These involve creating a group of health care practitioners who are legally allowed to practice 
independently of the state sector and charge fees.  Within two or three years many new governments in 
Central and Eastern Europe introduced legislation that made it legal for health professionals to work as 
private practitioners.  Although this did not immediately lead to an expanding private health care sector, 
the legislation can now be viewed as a significant step in the process of creating health care markets, where 
practitioners were in competition and service users started to pay for health care.   
 
Reforms of heath care financing and changes in hospital management and funding have also contributed to 
this process.    Several groups of stakeholders have played an important role in supporting these changes.  
Although these processes are present in all countries, there are examples of where fundamental changes 
have been challenged and/ or reversed (Oswald, 2000).   The strength of a continued goal of a universal 
health care system should not be underestimated.   
 
Health professionals need to be able to practice legally as independent or private practitioners.  For 
example, in Bulgaria, in 1991, amendments were passed to the People’s Health Act (first published in 
National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria Gazette, 1973) which gave rights to all practitioners and 
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dentists to have private practices.  In 1997, it became legal for doctors to charge co-payments for health 
care (Datsova, 2006).  Private providers of outpatient care were allowed to compete against state providers 
in 2000.  Although primary care is now commercialised but the majority of primary care doctors are 
dependent on the NHIF for contracts in Bulgaria. 
 
In Slovenia, in 1992, health professionals were given the legal right to practice as private practitioners.  A 
system of regulation was put in place, which required private practitioners to apply for recognition as a 
private provider, involving checking of qualifications and premises (Albrecht, Klazinga, 2009).  Co-payments 
and voluntary health insurance schemes were introduced as the same time, creating a structure for a 
privatised system.  Private providers require service users to pay for health care either directly through co-
payments or through voluntary health insurance schemes.   
 
c) Hospital management 
The management of hospitals and other health facilities have been subject to reforms, most often 
delegating responsibility from central to local government level, as part of a decentralisation process.  The 
extent to which hospitals have been privatised varies from country to country.   
 
There has been limited hospital privatisation in Bulgaria but in 1992, the Health Establishments Act led to a 
transfer of control of hospitals/ health care facilities from central government to local authority ownership.  
The national state still has ownership of half the capital and municipal authorities own the other half, under 
the control of the municipal council.  The change of ownership and change in legal status gave them 
opportunities to make profits.  In 2002, the privatisation of hospitals was postponed through the 
‘Privatization and Post privatization control Act’ but in 2002 the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
started to contract with private hospitals  
(Daskalova et al, 2005; Datzova, 2006).  
 
In the Czech Republic, some hospitals were privatised and have an influence over health policy.  Local 
authorities took over some hospitals and local physicians took over equipment, often using government 
loans to buy equipment, an example of government subsidised privatisation.  Community health centres 
were sold to non-profit, religious or private owners ( Oswald, 2000).  By contrast, there has been a slower 
process of privatisation of hospitals in Slovakia.  In 2002, the management of hospitals was decentralized, 
and some hospitals were given self-governing status. By 2003 most of them had been transferred to 
regional self-governments, or converted into non-profit bodies (Nemec & Lawson, 2005).   The remaining 
state hospitals have set up their own lobbying group. 
 
In Armenia, hospital management was reform initially by the 1991 Law on State Non-Commercial 
Organizations, which required health care facilities to be reconstituted as state non-commercial 
organizations.  In 1997, as part of the decentralization of the health care system, all health care facilities 
were reconstituted as non-commercial state joint stock companies following the 1996 Law on Joint Stock 
Companies (Nemec and Kolisnichenko, 2006).   
 
Changes in the status and management of public hospitals have led to the introduction of some form of 
marketisation.  The levels of competition vary from country to country.  This had been taking place at a 
time when the role of central and municipal government has been changing from a provider to purchaser 
and commissioner of services.  The influence of public and private hospitals as separate interest groups 
varies from country to country. 
 
d) Payment of fees for health care 
Almost every country in the region shows an increase in the percentage of household income being spent 
on health care after 1989.  In Bulgaria, from a position of 100%  state funding in 1989, over 98% of health 
spending is now from out of pocket spending (Datsova, 2006), when defined as fees for public sector 
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services or fees for access to private providers and medicines.  Income has become a major determinant of 
access to health care.   
 
Some governments have attempted to secure basic health care coverage for the poorest groups.  This can 
be done through the creation of a basic set of health care benefits.  In 1996, Armenia introduced a Basic 
Benefits Package (BBP) as part of a health care reform programme  (Nemec & Kolisnichenko, 2006).  
Another option is for government to pay the social insurance contributions for low income groups.  This has 
proved difficult for several countries as administrations have resisted making the contributions because it 
contributes to an increase in state spending.  In Poland, the failure of a privatisation programme was 
because government was expected to pay premiums for pensioners and unemployed people (Filinson et al, 
2003). 
 
Social insurance schemes are based on an employment model, with contributions made by employees and 
employers.  Unemployed people may be covered by a more basic benefit scheme or will be excluded from 
health care unless they make direct payments themselves (Datzova, 2006).   
 
Responses to reforms 
One of the characteristics of the political process that accompanied the introduction of health reforms in 
countries of central and Eastern Europe was that the participation of the public was limited.  The key actors 
were doctors, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and insurance companies.  Patients and local 
population were the least important group and had the most limited influence (Daskalova et al, 2005; 
Lawson & Nemec, 2003; Nemec & Lawson, 2005).  In Poland, there was patient hostility to insurance funds 
coupled with a lack of information and some misinformation that led to failure of a reform, which would 
have introduced universal access to health care (Filinson, 2003).   The lack of public participation in reforms 
should be understood in the context of countries where there is no tradition of civil society organisations or 
non-governmental organisations.    
 
In several countries, doctors were initially supporters of reforms as well as pharmaceutical companies and 
insurance companies. The alliance of these three groups has been active in many countries.  The role of 
hospitals as an interest varies according to the level of privatisation of the hospital sector.  In Slovakia, state 
hospitals have formed an interest group.  In Czech Republic, private hospitals influence health policy. 
 
Corruption 
The incidence of corruption, defined as “the use of public office for private gain” is perceived to have 
increased since the reforms, although it also existed before 1989.  In Bulgaria, both patients and health 
workers felt that “there is corruption in healthcare and it is even higher after the start of the reforms” 
(Dalkalova et al, 2005).  There are several points in the process of health care delivery that provide 
opportunities for bribes.  The use of informal payments is one of the most common forms but the factors 
that lead to informal payments are not the same in every country.  Low or irregular pay of health workers is 
one trigger.  Inability of patients to access a social insurance system can lead to them making informal 
payments to access healthcare. In some countries,  the existence of a private sector can lead to less 
pressure for health workers to ask for informal payments because the private sector provides an alternative 
source of health care, which can be paid for directly or through private health insurance.  This is more 
accessible for high income groups.  Low income groups are particularly vulnerable to informal payments 
because they are unable to afford either social insurance or private health insurance. 
 
There are several stages that have characterised the transformation of a state-run health care system to a 
market orientated system. The introduction of a new social insurance system for health financing is 
significant change.  Legislative changes that allow health care practitioner to practice as private 
practitioners as well as charge fees is one of the most significant changes.  The management arrangements 
of hospitals also change, sometimes become self-managing, but always becoming more commercialised.  
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The introduction of user fees or informal payments is another fundamental change, which affects access to 
health care by disadvantaged groups.   
 
Key stages 
 Changes in insurance for health financing 
 Legislation to allow health care practitioners to operate as private 
practitioners and charge fees 
 Decentralisation and self- management of hospitals 
 User fees or informal payments   
 Access to health services reduced 
 Corruption at different levels 
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6 Labour 
 
Health care is a labour-intensive activity and a highly motivated, well trained, well-paid labour force is an 
essential part in the delivery of high quality health care.   Although it is has a central role to play, it has 
often been seen as a problem that has to be addressed by public sector reforms.  A paper prepared for the 
OECD (2002) pointed out that: 
“There is a danger that the constitutional, legal, cultural and leadership factors, which together 
create what is important and distinctive about public services, are not reflected on, or are dismissed 
as the bureaucratic problem which must be 'reformed' ” (Matheson, 2002). 
 
Marketisation and privatisation have directly affected health workers, by increasing workloads, changing 
terms and conditions, and making health workers work towards targets and other aspects of a managerial 
agenda.  This has resulted in changes in the relationship with patients.   This section will examine a series of 
studies that have looked at how the health care workforce in different parts of the world has been affected 
by the processes of marketisation and commercialisation. 
    
Approaches to research 
A series of studies provides some indication of the extensive changes that health workers have experienced 
and how it has affected their socio-economic security  (Healy and Humphries, 1998; Brito el al, 2001; CUPE, 
2001; Stepantchikova et al, 2001; Lehmann and Saunders, 2003; Afford, 2003).  This research was often 
commissioned or undertaken by trade unions and other groups committed to workers’ rights.  More 
recently, a growing body of research has looked at the impact of public-private partnerships on pay and 
working conditions, as well as trying to capture how the public sector ‘ethos’ is changing.  This is based on 
the experience of the UK and provides some useful evidence of how the position of workers is affected by 
this type of private sector involvement.  Research studies of other countries, with varying degrees of 
private involvement in public health care, show how workers experience increased marketisation and 
private sector involvement. 
 
Study and country Data collection 
Afford C.W. (2003) Corrosive Reform: 
Failing health reforms in Eastern Europe 
ILI Socio-Economic Security Programme 
ILI/ PSI 
 
This study drew from three surveys into health workers’ 
insecurity in Central and Eastern Europe.  The first drew from 
data provided by 15 PSI affiliates who completed a Basic 
Security Survey for 1990-1999.  The second examined four 
countries, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine, to 
assess how restructuring was affecting the working lives of 
health workers through the use of interviews and surveys of 
management, government representatives, union officials and 
worker representatives.   The third survey looked at evidence of 
how the socio-economic situation in Russia was affecting health 
workers, through document analysis and interviews with health 
workers and their representatives. 
Owuso F. (2005) Livelihood strategies 
and performance of Ghana’s health & 
education sectors Public Administration 
& Development 25: 157-174 
Data for the study was drawn from fieldwork conducted 
between 1995 and 1996 in Wenchi and Techiman in the Brong 
Ahafo Region of Ghana and supplemented with information 
from the 1991–1992 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS). 
Interviews also were conducted with officials at the Ministries 
of Health and Education at the national and district levels. In 
addition, heads of selected public and private organisations, 
current and retired employees and service users in Wenchi and 
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Techiman were interviewed using structured questionnaires 
and focus-group discussions. 
Bhat R. and Maheshwari S.K. (2005)  
Human Resource Issues : Implications for 
Health Sector reforms 
Journal of Health Management 7(1):1-39  
A mix of qualitative and quantitative methodologies were used 
to study the commitment of district level health officials in a 
newly created state (Chhattisgarh) in India.   The exploratory 
study was conducted through focused group discussions with 
six district health officials and four officers in the state 
directorate. Individual interviews with four doctors at a 
community health centre and focus group discussions informed 
the development of a questionnaire, to assess relevant issues at 
management training programmes at the Indian Institute of 
Management. This was circulated to three groups attending the 
programmes, which consisted of 75 district and state health 
officials. 70 responded to the questionnaire.  
Zullo R.  & Ness I.  (2009) Privatization 
and the Working Conditions 
of Health Care Support International 
Journal of Public Administration, 32: 
152–165, 2009 
This study used an assisted survey approach, to compare health 
care service employees’ perceptions of work between public 
and privatized health care settings in the US. Two were public 
(one state and one county), two were public but contracted 
with private firms for specific services, and two were formerly 
public that converted to private control.   The sample size 
target was 300. 
Engstrom A.K. & Axelsson R. (2010) The 
double spiral of change—experiences 
of privatization in a Swedish hospital  
International Journal of Health Planning 
& Management 25: 156–168 
In-depth interviews have been performed with physicians, 
paramedics, secretaries, nurses, assistant nurses and local 
managers, in all 14 respondents, after a private 
entrepreneur had taken over the management of a hospital. 
The interviews were tape-recorded and have been analysed 
and interpreted following  a grounded theory approach 
Hebson G. Grimshaw D. &  Marchington 
M. (2003) Public Private Partnerships 
and the Changing Public Sector Ethos 
Work, Employment and Society 17(3): 
481–501 
 
Two detailed case studies of Public-private partnerships, called 
the Private Finance Initiative in the UK, consisting of one study 
in the health sector and one in the housing sector. 
Grimshaw D. Rubery J. & Marchington 
M. (2010) Managing people across 
hospital networks in the UK: multiple 
employers and the shaping of HRM 
Human Resource Management Journal  
20(4) : 407–423 
 
Two qualitative case studies of ‘best practice’ in long-term 
collaborative working. two case studies: a public–public 
network in health and social care (HSC), and a public–private 
partnership to manage and deliver ancillary services in a large 
acute hospital. Empirical observation was conducted at 
different levels within the inter-organisational partnerships and 
interviews with individuals employed by different partner 
organisation were conducted with managers, non-managerial 
staff and 2 trade union representative as well as analysis of 
documentary evidence of HR policies. A total of 26 interviews 
were conducted across the two cases. 
Bach S. & Givan R. K. (2010) Regulating 
employment conditions in a hospital 
network: the case of the Private Finance 
Initiative Human Resource Management 
Journal  20(4): 424-439 
A five-year case study of the workforce consequences of Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), which formed part of a wider study that 
examined trade union responses to new public management 
reforms.  The research was based on 33 semi-structured 
interviews with key actors.  At the national level, informants 
were drawn from national trade unions and the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC), employer organisations and investors in PFI 
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consortia. Each interview lasted between 30 and 90 minutes 
and was recorded and fully transcribed. A document analysis 
complemented the interview findings. 
 
Research question 
 What is the impact of marketisation and privatisation on the pay, working conditions and identity 
of health workers? 
 
Emerging themes 
 Pay and working conditions 
 Dealing with loss of income 
 Attitudes to work and public sector ethos 
 
Pay and working conditions 
Afford (2003) provides one of the most detailed accounts of how health workers have been affected by 
health sector reforms in countries of Central and Eastern Europe.   Looking at all aspects of workers’ 
security, the study shows that low pay and unpaid overtime were characteristic of almost all countries.  
Low pay was the result of falling wages, which were often paid late.  There was a loss of actual benefits, for 
example redundancy pay or pensions.  Although workers technically still were eligible for sick pay and 
holiday pay, many were afraid of losing their jobs so were unwilling to take time off.   
 
A physically deteriorating environment in many hospitals led to health workers being put at greater risk of 
accidents.  In addition, violence at work is a symptom of a health care system with reduced resources which 
means health workers are unable to provide patients with adequate care.    
 
Decentralisation led to local authorities being responsible for health worker employment contracts but they 
often did not have the expertise and resources, making workers more vulnerable.  Some groups of health 
care professionals had moved into the private sector and this has affected the security of nursing and 
support staff in each private practice.   
 
There are a range of other studies, often in one country, which contribute to a body of knowledge about 
how health workers are experiencing changes in the public health care sector in relation to their pay and 
conditions.    One of the most striking similarities in many  regions, is that the levels of pay and benefits for 
health workers are often deteriorating as a result of marketisation and privatisation.   
 
Zullo & Ness (2009) explored the different perceptions of rewards between health ancillary workers in the 
public and private sectors in the United States.   They found that health ancillary workers felt that rewards 
were lower in the private sector as well as the quality of supervision being lower in private companies.  
There was also a decrease in opportunities for learning new skills and promotion.  Privatisation resulted in 
employees losing rights to negotiate pay and benefits.  This fitted into the belief that the aim of contracting 
was to reduce costs, which in labour intensive activities, has to involve reducing pay and terms and 
conditions.  
 
Similar finding were reported by Hebson et al (2003) in a study of two Private Finance Initiatives (PSI) 
initiatives in the United Kingdom (UK), one of which was a new hospital initiative.  They found that for non-
managerial workers, terms and conditions had often worsened. Although the  UK has a Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (TUPE) Regulations, which is supposed to provide some 
protection for workers who are transferred to a private sector company, that company may introduce a 
reorganisation for technical, business or organisational reasons or workers may be transferred to another 
company taking on a public sector contract (Page, 2004).   
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Another study shows a more nuanced view of how employment conditions have changed in a PFI hospital 
(Bach & Givan 2010), which reflects some more recent UK governmental strategies.   In 2005, the unions, 
employers and Department of Health in the UK came to an agreement that private contractors in NHS 
hospitals would give pay and terms and conditions which were ‘no less favourable’ (Bach & Givan, 
2010:427).  The costs of this initiative would be split between the NHS and private contractors.  This has 
been seen as a way of reassuring staff when transferring to the private sector.  It is also a form of 
government re-regulation, considered necessary to continue the public private partnership agenda. 
 
In this case the commitment of managers of NHS Trust and private contractor increased the scope for re-
regulation.  Effective workplace trade union organisation enabled national agreements to be implemented 
at local level.  Union density is not as high in many PFI initiatives, so this option is not always available.    
This study concludes that PPPs or this form of marketisation does not necessarily lead to the retreat of the 
state.  In the short term, re-regulation may be necessary to resolve issues between the workforce and the 
private company.  However, there are limits to the extent to which the private sector can be ‘guided’ by the 
public sector.   In the UK, pensions were a contentious issue that were not resolved through re-regulation.   
Since Bach and Givan (2010) published this article, there has been a change of government which is 
abandoning many aspects of re-regulation. Public sector pensions are now subject to attack by 
government, so addressing concerns of the private sector about pension contributions.  
    
Dealing with loss of income 
Health workers affected by falling wages and late or non-payment wages have to adopt strategies to deal 
with loss of income.    Migrating to another country to find a better paid job is one solution which has been 
reflected in high rates of health care worker migration from countries with limited health care resources to 
countries with countries with a demand for health care workers.  This has led to a depletion of skilled 
health care workers in countries that are already experiencing a weakening of health care systems.   
 
Another solution to falling levels of pay, which also affects the quality of health care, is that health workers 
either find a second job, often in the private sector.  Attempting to do two jobs affects the quality of health 
care delivered.  This may be accompanied by a demand from health workers for informal payments from 
patients (see section on Informal Payments).  
 
Many health workers in African countries have experienced falls in real wages and loss of benefits since the 
1970s and their experience is important in understanding how changes in the pay and conditions of health 
workers affects the quality of health care.  Owuso (2003) reported that Ghanaian workers had been 
involved in strategies to maintain their incomes after the introduction of the 1985 Hospital Fees Regulation, 
which required the Ministry of Health (MOH) to generate at least 15% of total recurrent expenditure, which 
was an early attempt to reform the health sector.   This was followed by attempts to promote cost-recovery 
along with the redeployment of staff and reduction of recruitment.  The immediate result was that the 
quality of health care deteriorated.  The percentage of people who accessed public health care between 
1992 and 1998 decreased by 12.8% and this percentage was higher among very low income groups.  There 
was an increase in the level of patient dissatisfaction with the service received.  Some health sector 
employees collected unauthorized fees, whist others demand bribes and ‘tips’ before a service is provided.   
A freeze of jobs in the health sector meant that health care workers had more opportunities to work 
overtime and/or convert their annual leave time into money. In 1994, overtime payments to health care 
employees amounted to 10% of the total expenditure.   This study shows that when health worker incomes 
are reduced, health workers have to adopt survival strategies which affect the quality of health care. 
 
Public sector ethos 
Motivation of health care workers plays an important role in high quality health care services.  A growing 
number of studies are looking at changes in the attitudes of health workers following the introduction of 
marketisation and privatisation.  Some studies show that these policies sometimes affect relationships 
between health care workers.   
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In the UK, a study of health workers operating in a new public-private partnership, a Private Finance 
Initiative hospital,  which aimed to improve services as an alternative to direct contracting out of services to 
the private sector. The PFI initiative was an NHS Acute Trust,  in partnership with a private sector 
consortium, which subcontracted building construction and facilities management to two separate private 
sector companies (Grimshaw et al, 2010).  Managers from the hospital trust were trying to develop systems 
to share information between them and the managers of the company responsible for contracting of 
facilities management services.   
 
Although extensive time and resources were used, there were several factors that undermined the 
development of shared information.  There was a high turnover of managers in the facilities management 
company which made sharing information difficult.  A second problem was the management of NHS staff 
by the facilities management company, which NHS managers felt was problematic between of the different 
goals of the private company.  Although the private company was felt able to provide access to training 
facilities, which an NHS hospital might not have access to;  there were some more fundamental problems.  
It was difficult to encourage staff to apply for supervisory posts because it  involved changing employer 
from the NHS to the private company.   
 
National NHS training policies, such as ‘Improving Working Lives’, were supposed to be implemented across 
the hospital, including the private facilities management company but these also cut across the company 
human resource systems.    The private company, although agreeing with the NHS on skill standards, did 
not open access to its commercial awareness training.  This shows that bringing an NHS hospital together 
with a private company presents difficulties because of the different goals of the two organisations.  Public 
and private goals are different and cannot easily be reconciled. 
 
A study of how public-private partnership arrangements have influenced the public sector ‘ethos’  looked at 
the changes that have taken place in the different dimensions of public sector ‘ethos’ in the health and 
housing sectors.  The four dimensions considered were accountability, bureaucratic behaviour, public 
interest, motivation and loyalty.  Hebson et al (2003) found that the contract system of decision making 
was replacing a more transparent arrangement of accountability and bureaucratic behaviour.  Public and 
private managers were found to have different priorities and the process of monitoring a contract did not 
lead to high trust relationships. The greater scope for managerial discretion led to a breakdown of trust and 
public sector managers became more manipulative to secure value for money.   
 
Although working for performance related targets has replaced working for the public interest, there was 
evidence that principles of working for the public interest and public accountability have not been 
completely eroded (Hebson et al, 2003: 498).  To what extent this will continue, when the overall 
motivation is presented as meeting performance targets is unclear. 
 
Looking at the attitudes from the perspectives of health workers in a recently privatisated hospital in 
Sweden, Engstrom & Alexsson (2010) found that trust in their employer was an important part of their 
working life.  Without trust, their working lives would be more difficult.  In this study of a recent 
privatisation, workers did not have confidence in the new owner, which was affected by the recent 
acquisition of the employer by an international venture capital company.  The workers felt that their 
employer had to show an interest in them.  They were worried about the lack of interest that the employer 
was showing in the increased sickness absence and the loss of doctors in the hospital.  This was part of a 
lack of confidence in organisation and human resource management.  The workers wanted to be part of 
plans for the future of the hospital, hoping the new owner has plans for its expansion, but they had not 
heard anything.    They did not trust the information that management was giving them and did not feel 
that the new owner was really leading the organisation. 
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Health workers were also anxious about the need of the owner to generate profit, not knowing how this 
would affect the running of the hospital.  Being part of a privatised hospital was felt to impact on the scope 
of health workers to be part of the national health system, for example projects and training.  The 
employees had not been fully involved in the decision to take over the hospital.  Well-established teams 
had been broken up before privatisation but some new smaller teams were developing post-privatisation.  
Respondents also felt that there had been a deterioration in the services:  
“the takeover had led to a poorer service, such as reduced telephone access, which resulted in 
frustration among the population. In addition, the cost of a visit could no longer be invoiced and 
only cash payments were accepted” ( Engstrom & Alexsson, 2010). 
However, pride in their work was considered to be related to how the health workers,   performed as 
professionals, rather than being influenced by who owned the hospital, a separation of professional 
interests from commercial ones.  This study shows how attitudes of health workers are quickly influenced 
by changes in ownership of a hospital. 
 
India has a large public health care sector that is gradually being affected by the promotion of private 
health care companies and the encouragement of government doctors to pursue private practice.  A study 
of health care workers in a new state of Chandigarh, India, found they were motivated to provide high 
quality services through their sense of professional responsibility.  A continued sense of job security and a 
seniority-based pay system in government jobs contributed to a cooperative behaviour among the doctors. 
However, this cooperative behaviour was gradually being undermined by competitive private practices by 
government doctors, which was linked to enhancement of their professional interests (Bhat and 
Maheshwari, 2005).    
 
This research also concluded with some insights about the tasks that health professionals were increased 
expected to provide.  They felt that they had to perform three different types of tasks, which required 
three different types of skills: regulating and monitoring (authority), provision of health care services 
(influence), and facilitating and coordinating the provision of services (coordination).  These three skills sets 
are an indication of how the nature of being a health worker is changing (Bhat and Maheshwari, 2005). 
 
Key points 
 
 Health workers have experienced deterioration of pay and working conditions  
 Reduced pay or erratic payments of salaries results in workers adopting survival 
strategies which affect quality of health care 
 Working with the private sector is difficult due to different goals 
 Re-regulation of workers rights often necessary to persuade workers to move from 
the public to private sector 
 Trust and public sector ‘ethos’ is affected by trying to being public and private 
interests together 
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7 Competition, hospital efficiency and privatisation 
 
In current debates about marketisation and privatisation, the introduction of competition and establishing 
‘diverse providers’ are considered to contribute to the efficiency of health services.  This section will 
consider a series of studies that explore the impact of competition on the efficiency of health services and 
the relationship between ownership and efficiency. 
 
Research questions 
 What is the relationship between competition and efficiency in health services? 
 What is the relationship between ownership and efficiency in health services? 
 
Approaches to research 
The terms efficiency and effectiveness, both widely used as goals of health sector reform, are difficult to 
define and measure.  Hussey et al (2009) in a systematic review of health care efficiency measures found 
that there had been few evaluations of the reliability and validity of widely used efficiency measures.  A 
further finding was that quality of care was rarely considered by the 265 different measures of efficiency.  It 
is this lack of consensus about how to measure quality of care that questions the many ways of measuring 
efficiency.     
 
Hussey et al developed a typology of efficiency measures from the review.  This consists of three levels: 
 Perspective: Who is evaluating the efficiency of which intervention/ service and what is the 
objective of the evaluation? 
 Outputs: What type of product is being evaluated, e.g. health services or outcomes? 
 Inputs: What inputs are used to produce the output? For example, nursing hours, bed days, 
quantities of drugs, which can be defined as physical inputs and financial inputs (Hussey et al, 2009: 
787). 
One of the issues arising is whether outputs are comparable, especially in relation to quality.  There may be 
differences within a service or in a group of services.  There may be differences between patients.  The 
review also found that most of the studies of efficiency of health care were focused on hospital care.  
Incorporating measures for quality in efficiency measures is a relatively undeveloped process and it is this 
lack of quality measures that undermine the validity of current effectiveness measures.   
  
Measurement of efficiency  
There are several tools used to measure health care efficiency.   Three of the most commonly used are 
outlined below. 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis/ Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Two benchmarking techniques, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis, are both 
forms of ‘frontier analysis’.   Developed for use in industrial settings, these two techniques measure the 
inputs and outputs of a process in order to identify the most efficiency combinations of inputs and outputs.  
Both techniques require a definition of the relationship between inputs and outputs. This is more difficult 
to define in the context of the health care sector because the factors that influence the efficient delivery of 
health care may not be just the more obvious factors, such as hours of nursing care or amount of drugs 
(Hussey et al , 2009: 793)  
 
Malmquist Productivity Index 
The Malmquist Productivity Index has been used to measure health care efficiency.  This measure has also 
been developed in a business/ industrial context and then applied to the health care setting. 
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Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
The Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures market share of companies is a measure of firm 
ownership used in economic studies.   It has been applied to hospital ownership and other aspects of 
hospital activities.   The Herfindahl Hirschman Index is drawn up by calculating the sum of the squared 
market share for all companies/ hospitals/entities.  The index ranges from 0 to 10,000 with lower scores 
indicating a more competitive market (US Dept. of Justice, 2011). 
 
The first two measures originate from industrial organisational studies, which have been designed to 
measure the efficiency of industrial organisations in terms of inputs and outputs.  This immediately raises 
the question of the appropriateness of using measures designed for an industrial production process but 
now applied to the delivery of health care.  The lack of a quality dimension in many efficiency studies 
illustrates this problem.  Hollingsworth et al (1999), in a review of measuring health care through DEA and 
the Malmquist Productivity Index, recommended caution in interpreting results.  The inability to measure 
real outputs of health care, for example, change in health status, undermines their validity.  Both 
techniques work better with a simpler manufacturing activity rather then a multi-dimensional process such 
as health care. 
 
1. Competition and efficiency 
 
Research studies and methodologies 
 
Study Methodology 
Propper C. & Soderlund N. (1998) 
Competition in the NHS Internal market: an 
overview of its effects on hospitals prices and 
costs Health Economics 7:187-197 
Pricing 
Propper C. Burgess S. Gossage D. (2003) 
Competition and Quality: Evidence from the 
NHS Internal market 1991-99  
CMPO Working Paper Series No 03/077 
Pricing  
Quality indicator - death rates from acute 
myocardial infarction as an indicator of 
quality 
Gaynor M. Moreno-Serra R. and  Propper C. 
(2010/11)  Death by Market Power Reform, 
Competition and Patient Outcomes in the 
National Health Service  Working Paper No. 
10/242 Centre for Market and Public 
Organisation  
Herfindahl Hirschman Index(HHI) 
Patient flows to a hospital were chosen as 
an indicator of market share.  It was 
assumed that the greater the number of 
patients attending the hospital, the higher 
the degree of market concentration (fewer 
competitors) and so the lower rate of 
competition 
Ferrari A. (2006)  The internal market and 
hospital efficiency: a stochastic distance 
function approach Applied Economics 38: 
2121-2139 
Stochastic frontier analysis used five inputs: 
total capital charges; medical staff FTE; 
nursing staff FTE; other staff FTE and; total 
number of beds.  Output was defined as 
total number of cases treated. 
Cooper Z. Gibbons S. Jones S. & McGuire A. 
(2010) Does hospital competition improve 
efficiency? An analysis of the recent market-
based reforms for the English NHS  
Centre for Economic Performance Discussion 
Paper No 988 June 2010 LSE/ESRC 
Difference in difference estimator. Length 
of Stay (LOS) was broken down into two key 
components: the time from a patient’s 
admission until their surgery (pre-surgery 
LOS) and the time from their surgery until 
their discharge (post-surgery LOS). 
Chen C-C. Cheng S-H. (2010) Hospitals 
competition and patient-perceived quality of 
HHI – assessed through the number of 
discharges divided by the total market area 
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care: evidence from a single payer system in 
Taiwan Health Economics 98 65-73  
discharges  
Quality indicators  - interpersonal skills and 
clinical competency 
Chua C. L. Palangkaraya A. & Yong J. (2011) 
Hospital competition, technical efficiency The 
Economic Record 1-17 
HHI – assessed by using patient locational 
information for the main Diagnostic Related 
Groups and the significance of the local 
area in supplying patients to a hospital. 
 
NHS internal market 
The introduction of an internal market to the NHS in the UK has been the subject of several studies that 
attempt to assess whether competition has had an impact on efficiency.  The results appear to be mixed.  
Studies which examine data at the beginning of the internal market, between 1991-1999, show that 
competition has had a limited impact on efficiency.   A couple of more recent studies show that the internal 
market has led to increased efficiency.  These studies will be discussed below, with some of their limitations 
highlighted. 
 
Farrari (2006) studied the changes in technical efficiency of a panel of 52 acute Scottish hospitals, from 
1991/92 to 1996/9, which included both trusts (hospitals given ownership of assets, part of a process of 
corporatisation of public hospitals) and the more traditional general hospitals. The Stochastic Frontier 
analysis used five inputs: total capital charges; medical staff FTE; nursing staff FTE; other staff FTE and; total 
number of beds.  Output was defined as total number of cases treated. 
The changes in the two time periods showed that over time the opportunity cost of treating a patient has 
increased.  More patients were being treated as day cases than as in-patients.   The results showed that 
hospitals changed both the services that they provided as well as the way in which they provided services.  
The trend was towards the faster treatment of patients on a day basis.  However, there was no significant 
improvement in technical efficiency shown over time or between trusts and non-trusts.  This study was 
undertaken during the early period of the internal market. 
 
A series of studies by Propper and Soderlund (1998), Propper, Burgess and Gossage, (2003) and Gaynor, 
Moreno-Serra and Propper (2010/1) show that, as the internal market has evolved, the results of 
competition appear to have changed, although different methodologies were used. These studies are 
informed by the economic theory that increased competition will lead to decreases in prices and costs of 
production.    Two of these studies used changes in prices as a basis for measuring competition but a third 
study used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure competition. 
 
Propper and Soderlund (1998) examined competition in the internal market as measured by changes in 
price and the costs of producing the services.  They reviewed a number of studies that examined prices in 
the internal market and found that NHS pricing rules have been relatively ineffective in the way that 
providers set prices for extra curricula referrals (ECRs)(extra referrals) and GP fundholding (where GPs held 
their own budget for contracting health care for their patients).  Price variation was mainly determined by 
cost variations.  There was relatively little evidence of competition on prices but there was some indication 
that it did have some effect on prices for low cost procedures.  Many hospitals had actually decreased costs 
during this period but this might be because at the beginning of the internal market, hospitals started with 
higher average costs.  The period being studied was relatively short, 1992/3 and 1993/4 and only two years 
after the creation of the internal market.  
 
Propper, Burgess and Gossage (2003) explore the impact of competition in the NHS internal market in the 
period 1991-1999.  This was a period which encompassed two changes in policy emphasis: an initial focus 
on competition and the new internal market was compared to a second period when the emphasis on price 
competition was reduced. The study also acknowledges that competition between hospitals in England is 
difficult to measure because the spatial distribution of hospitals was strongly informed by the historical 
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development of hospitals.  This means that in some areas there are several hospitals and so increased 
competition, whereas in other areas, there are limited hospitals and so no effective competition.   
 
The study chose death rates from acute myocardial infarction as an indicator of quality.   Hospitals in areas 
where there was a higher level of competition because there were more hospitals, showed higher death 
rates than in areas with more limited competition.  They estimated that although the whole sector 
experienced reduced death rates, these were probably due to technological innovation.  
 
In a third and more recent study, Gaynor, Moreno-Serra & Propper (2010/1) analysed the impact of the 
new pricing system, ‘Payment by Results’, which was introduced in 2006 by comparing data from 2003/4 to 
2007/8. ‘Payment by Results’ was a fixed price prospective reimbursement system.  Private providers were 
introduced into the NHS, through a series of contracts that gave very favourable terms to private 
companies (Player & Leys, 2008).  A third change was that patients were given the opportunity to choose 
which hospital to go for in-patient care. 
 
Gaynor et al used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to calculate the degree of competition by 
measuring the patient flows to a hospital as an indicator of market share.  It was assumed that the greater 
the number of patients attending the hospital, the higher the degree of market concentration (fewer 
competitors) and so the lower rate of competition.  The study found that concentration has a statistically 
significant positive effect on mortality, so that higher market concentration (a larger HHI) led to lower 
quality. A 10% increase in the HHI led to an increase of 2.91% in the acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 
death rate.  A 10% fall in the HHI was associated with a fall in the 30 day death rate following AMI 
admissions, by 2.91%.  Reductions in market concentration were found to result in a reduced length of stay.  
There were no increases in operating costs or expenditure per admission so that markets that became less 
concentrated did not appear to increase costs.  The study concluded that the 2006 reforms in pricing led to 
improved health outcomes as measured by reductions in mortality and shorter length of stay in hospital, 
resulting in either no increased expenditure or in some cases reduced expenditure. 
 
This third study of the NHS internal market examines a different time period to the earlier studies.  It uses a 
different methodology, in that it calculated a HHI for hospital rather than using changes in pricing.    The 
assumptions that patient flows to a hospital can be considered as an indicator of competitiveness can be 
questioned because traditionally competitiveness concentrations are measured by share of sales, which are 
different to health care interventions.    The study explores a new phase in the development of pricing 
mechanisms in the internal market. 
 
Studies that look at a specific intervention in a specific region/ state/ province need to be interpreted with 
care.  Another study, Cooper et al (2010) looked at the effect of competition on efficiency after 2006 in 
England after the introduction of ‘Payment by Results’ (mentioned above).  Efficiency was measured using 
hospitals’ average length of stay (LOS) for patients undergoing elective hip replacement. LOS was broken 
down into  two key components: the time from a patient’s admission until their surgery (pre-surgery LOS) 
and the time from their surgery until their discharge (post-surgery LOS).  Data from the period 2002 to 2008 
was analysed, so covering the period before the introduction of ‘Payment by Results’.  The study found that 
hospitals cut down on the pre-surgery LOS but not on post –surgery LOS, which led to reduced length of 
stay. This was interpreted as being more efficient.  The study concludes that the measures to stimulate 
competition after 2006 (payment by results, private sector competition and patient choice) resulted in 
improvements in hospital efficiency.     
 
Interestingly, it sees a market with fixed prices “led to marked improvements in hospital efficiency”.  The 
emphasis on fixed prices is important and seems to be argue against the earlier findings of the studies led 
by Propper et al.  The study is of one single intervention (hip replacements) and uses length of stay as its 
indicator of efficiency.   Using the results of a single intervention to generalise about competition in the 
NHS is not a basis for drawing conclusions.  Also, the impact of increased competition from the private 
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sector is not technically accurate as the independent treatment centres were given highly favourable 
conditions for entering the NHS market (Leys & Player, 2008). 
 
These studies on the impact of the internal market on competition in the NHS illustrate how the stage in 
the development of the internal market can influence results as much as the different ways in which 
competition and efficiency are measured.   The introduction of internal markets to public sector health care 
systems is a relatively new process and is shaped by public policy as much as more conventional market 
mechanisms, such as price.  The studies also illustrate some of the hazards of trying to calculate the degree 
of competition in a changing system. In addition, measurements of competition in terms of patient flows, is 
not necessarily a realistic measure of commercial competition. 
 
Taiwan  
Two studies of the health care system in Taiwan also show some of the difficulties in measuring 
competition in a health care system which is still introducing competition.  Chen et al, (2010) used patient 
satisfaction as an indicator of quality of care. Interpersonal skills and clinical competency were used as two 
quality indicators.   In a study of Taiwan, where there is a single payer system, these two indicators were 
found to be positively associated with higher levels of competition.  This study measured competition using 
the HH Index.  This was assessed through the number of discharges per hospital divided by the total market 
area discharges.  This is an unusual study in that it uses patient views as quality measures rather then more 
conventional inputs and outputs associated with DEA and SFA.  However, measuring competition as 
number of discharges is also an artificial form of competition.  
 
Chu, Chian and Chang (2010) examined 102 teaching hospitals in Taiwan during the period 1996-2001, by 
using results from an annual hospital survey.  This period was soon after the introduction of competition in 
Taiwan.    New systems of payment were introduced which included fee for services, case payment, global 
budget and fee for capital.  These were gradually introduced between 1995 and 2002.  Patients can choose 
any hospital and co-payments are similar for hospitals of the same accredited level (Chu et al, 2010).  The 
study examines the differences between competition in 1996 and 2001.   
 
The measure of competition to inform the HHI was calculated using patient locational information for the 
main Diagnostic Related Groups and the significance of the local area in supplying patient to a hospital.   
The majority of the hospitals are private or community teaching hospitals.   
 
The study found that increased competition did not have an impact on hospital efficiency in delivering 
inpatient services.   Higher regional income was associated with low efficiency.  High hospital accreditation 
status was associated with high efficiency and hospital accreditation upgrades were associated with 
efficiency.  
The study suggested that the reasons for the lack a relationship between market competition and efficiency 
could be explained because hospitals may compete on quality rather than efficiency.  The study also found 
that hospitals in high competition areas invested more resources but these did not necessarily lead to 
greater effectiveness.   The study concluded that more studies were needed to understand how 
competition affects quality and effectiveness.    
         
As internal markets in health care are still evolving, it is difficult to design studies that can take this 
evolution into consideration.  The attempts to estimate competition shows that this can be done in many 
ways.  The Herfindahl Hirschman Index(HHI) was designed to measure industrial competition and it is 
questionable whether hospital competition and industrial competition are similar.  
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2. Ownership and efficiency 
 
Research studies and methodologies 
 
Herr A. (2008) Cost and technical efficiency of German 
Hospitals: does ownership matter?  Health Economics 17: 
1057–1071 (2008)  
Stochastic Frontier Analysis –  
hospital ranking based on 
estimated efficiency score  
 
Tiemann C. & Schreyogg J. (2009) Effects of Ownership 
on Hospital Efficiency in 
Germany BuR - Business Research Official Open Access 
Journal of VHB Verband der Hochschullehrer für 
Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 2 (2)) :115-145 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis DEA 
Barbetta G P. Turati G. Zag A.M. (2001)  On the impact of 
ownership structure and hospitals efficiency in Italy 
Available from University of Oviedo 
http://www.unioviedo.es/7ewepa/pdf/barbetta.PDF 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis DEA 
Dalmau-Matarrodona E. &  Puigunoy J. (1998) Market 
Structure and Hospital Efficiency: Evaluating Potential 
Effects of Deregulation in a National Health Service 
Review of Industrial Organization 13: 447–466. 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI 
– defined through patient flows 
 
Lian Chan C. Palangkaraya A. & Young J. (2011) Hospital 
Competition, Technical Efficiency and Quality The 
Economic Record 2011 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI 
 
 
 
Studies of ownership and efficiency in European countries show varying results.  Two studies of German 
hospitals show that efficiency varies with types of ownership and that public hospitals are more efficient 
than private or nonprofits.  Details of these studies and several other relevant studies are set out below. 
 
Herr (2008) showed that hospital efficiency does vary with ownership, patient structure, and other external 
factors. The study looked at data for 2001 to 2003.  It calculated hospital costs, subtracting research and 
out patient care from total costs.  Inputs included number of beds, doctors, nurses and other staff.  The 
study found that private and non-profit hospitals are on average less cost efficient and less technically 
efficient than publicly owned hospitals. The hospital rankings based on estimated efficiency scores turn out 
to be negatively correlated with average length of stay, which is highest in private hospitals.  
 
Another study of ownership and efficiency in Germany by Tiemann  & Schreyogg  (2009), which examined 
public, private for-profit, and private non-profit hospitals in Germany between 2002 and 2006.  It found 
that public hospitals operate at a significantly higher level of efficiency than other types of hospitals.  For-
profit hospitals were associated with lower efficiency but the authors hypothesize that for-profit hospitals 
may have found other ways to maximise profits, through maximising revenues.  Private for-profit providers 
are more efficient among the very large hospitals with more than 1,000 beds. 
 
A study of Italian hospitals (Barbetta et al, 2001) looked at the technical efficiency of Italian hospitals (non-
profits and public hospitals) for the period 1995 to 1998.  The findings suggested that publicly owned 
hospital are more efficient than not for profit hospitals when the number of discharged patients is 
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considered as an output.  However, different results were obtained when using different techniques, for 
examples when discharged patients were defined as outputs.  Non-profit organizations appear more 
efficient when considering the length of stay. 
 
Dalmau-Matarrodona  &  Puigunoy (1998) in a study in Spain which examined the effect of market 
structure on hospital technical efficiency as a measure of performance controlled by ownership and 
regulation.  Results showed that the number of competitors in the market contributed positively to 
technical efficiency and there is some evidence that the differences in efficiency scores are attributed to 
environmental factors such as ownership, market structure and regulation effects.  This survey was 
conducted at an early stage in the development of the Spanish internal health care market. 
 
A study of hospitals in Victoria, Australia looked at links between competition and technical efficiency of 
public hospitals in Australia.  It used the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure competition and 
calculated this by estimating the market for each DRG by using patient locational information defined at 
the statistical local area and by measuring the significance of the SLA in providing patient for the hospital.  
This methodology is a similar attempt to construct markets by looking at patient flows.   
 
The study showed that there was a positive relationship between market concentration and efficiency but 
the study also found that efficiency was reduced with a larger number of competing hospitals.  The authors 
suggest that the reason for this variation was that larger numbers of competing hospitals leads not just to 
competition for patients but also for doctors, which can causes problems in providing care.   This is an 
important study in that it shows the dangers of competition not just from a perspective of reducing costs 
but also the effect of competition on the labour market for health care workers. 
 
A review of several studies that examine the impact of competition on the efficiency of hospitals in 
different countries show varied results, which can be influenced by the institutional settings (public, private 
and non-profit).  Studies that look at the impact of ownership on efficiency in the health care sector, rather 
than the impact of competition on efficiency in the public and private sectors, show a slightly more 
consistent set of results, in that public hospitals are more likely to be efficient, although this too depends 
on how efficiency is measured.   
 
Key points 
 The use of techniques designed to measure effectiveness in industrial production 
are not necessarily appropriate for health care 
 The evolution of internal market reforms make comparison of competition studies 
difficult 
 The lack of quality measures of health care undermine existing studies of health care 
efficiency  
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8 SOCIAL CARE – A CASE STUDY IN PRIVATISATION OF A 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
Social care is a set of activities that covers non-medical care, which may be delivered at home, in a 
residential setting or at a community day centre.  It may be delivered by paid and unpaid carers.  Social care 
provides essential care for older people, which enables them to live independent lives.  Social care is often 
used as an administrative term, which covers both home and institutional care. The tasks cover physical 
care but also include ‘enabling’ older people to be independent and as active as possible. The delivery of 
care involves some form of relationship with the older person (Moss, 2004: 6).   As a result, a care worker 
plays a number of roles, which draw from a wide range of skills, as friend, mentor; adviser and service 
provider (Hansen & Jensen, 2004).  These are all complex and demanding roles which are not widely valued 
by many societies and demand a level of ‘emotional’ labour.  They are most often performed by women.  
Social care services are labour intensive and the quality of social care depends on the quality of labour, in 
terms of pay and conditions and training.  Rubery et al (2011) concluding a study of social care in England 
found that good quality care and good quality jobs are complementary and depend on good relationships 
between users and care workers.  
 
Process of privatisation 
From the 1980s, public sector reforms were introduced to municipal services in many European countries, 
which led to social care services being subject to an internal market.  Many local authorities became 
purchasers or commissioners of care and gradually gave up their provider roles.  Care services were 
contracted to either profit or non-profit providers.  The underlying assumption was that the introduction of 
competition would lead to a reduction in costs.  Delivering care through a quasi-market arrangement 
introduced cost-efficiencies, managerialism and accountability, which led to a commodification of care 
services.   This process translated care activities into timed and costed tasks, which care workers had to 
deliver as quickly as possible.   As care services are labour intensive services, any reduction in costs has to 
be a reduction in labour costs. Countries in the Nordic region and the UK/ Ireland illustrate what happens 
to the delivery of a public service (social care) through an internal market. 
 
In Sweden, full responsibility for long term nursing care was transferred from the county councils to 
municipalities in 1992.  These reforms, known as the ADEL reforms, have led in a similar way to an 
expansion of private sector provision with the contracting out of long-term care facilities, home-care 
services, meal and transport services. The total number of nursing home beds has declined since 1992.  In 
1992, there were about 32,000 beds but following the ADEL reform these beds were transferred to the 
social care sector and the municipalities with some transfer of beds from the public sector to the private 
and non-profit sectors (Trydefard, Thorslund, 2001). 
 
The ADEL reform altered the way in which care for older people was funded and impacted on the delivery 
of social care. It moved the responsibility for funding to municipalities and increased the workload in both 
institutional and home based care services.  This has been accompanied by the closure of local county 
council hospitals with geriatric beds, although municipalities were unable to expand care for older people.  
Services are now targeted to those with higher dependency needs (Glenngard et al, 2005).   In 1997 the 
Swedish Parliament decided to give priority to people with greatest demands among those with high 
degrees of dependency.  This left people with lower degrees of dependency having to either pay for extra 
support or depend on family and friends.  There is a shortage of skilled personnel in the primary care 
sector.   At a municipal level, there has been an increase in private provided care for older people.    
 
Many for-profit providers now dominate the market for social care.  In the UK, there has been a similar 
dramatic change in the last two decades from a system where the majority of social care services were 
delivered by local authorities to a privatised system, where for-profit providers dominate provision.  
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Canada has been through a similar experience of moving residential care from public or not-for-profit 
provision to for-profit provision.  The United States has a longer term experience of privatised social care.   
 
Research into social care privatisation focuses on several themes   
A growing body of research has been commissioned by public agencies, trade unions, and charitable 
foundations that explores the delivery of social care in relation to public, private and not-for-profit 
providers of services.  Most research has looked at the delivery of care in residential and long term care 
homes, rather than home care, which is more difficult to assess.  It has also been conducted mainly in 
American care homes, where the existence of a large private sector is well established.  Evidence has been 
gathered on three relationships that help to explain the impact of private ownership on the quality of care.  
They are:  
a) Staffing levels and quality of care;   
b) Ownership & health outcomes; 
c) Quality working conditions. 
 
Research questions 
 What is the relationship between staffing levels and quality of care? 
 What is the relationship between private provision, staffing levels and working conditions?  
 
a) Staffing levels and quality of care 
In 2001, The United States Congress commissioned the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) to 
examine relationships between staffing levels, health and safety and health outcomes.  The CMS study 
found that there was a relationship between staffing ratios and the quality of nursing home care.  The 
study identified different staffing thresholds according to type of nurse and whether the nursing home was 
long or short stay.   This was significant because it measured labour inputs, health outcomes and profit 
status and worked out the number of hours nursing care that was required each day.  This was used to set 
minimum standards of staffing for homes receiving Medicare funding.   This study (2001) found that a 
minimum staffing level of 4.1 worked hours per resident day was required to avoid jeopardizing the health 
and safety of long term care residents. The 4.1 hours per resident per day included 2.4 to 3.1 nursing 
assistant hours and 0.95 to 1.55 licensed nurse (Registered Nurse and Licenced Practical Nurse) hours, each 
with different health outcome improvements. (CMS, 2001).  This is one of the largest systematic studies 
that has looked at levels of staffing and quality of care. 
 
Spilsbury et al (2011) examined the evidence-base that looked at the relationship between the level of 
staffing and the quality of care received by nursing home residents.  The review found that levels of staffing 
were measured in terms of total staffing, as well as staffing of the different types of nurses, related to level 
of qualifications and the amount and types of training received.  There were no standard quality indicators 
for care found in the studies reviewed but the most often used indicators were more specific health 
indicators which included pressure ulcers/ sores, physical restraints, functional status, mortality, 
hospitalisation, nutritional status.   
 
Total nurse staffing was found to be more likely to influence better outcomes but different nurse groups 
also have an influence on health outcomes.  This review concludes that the existing evidence base is diverse 
showing a wide range of findings and because of different methods used to assess quality.  The evidence 
showed that the total numbers of nurses, registered nurses and nurse assistant staff have a positive 
influence on care but licensed practical nurses had a weaker influence on quality of care.  However, the 
research studies did not explain the nature of the relationship between different types of nurses, levels of 
training and quality indicators.  The studies looked at the US experience and so the results cannot 
necessarily be applied to other countries. 
 
This review also found that the levels of staffing had an impact on levels of quality but there has to be a 
threshold of staffing before any increases in quality appear. There is also a relationship between 
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improvements in quality and an increase in resources.  There is an upper level of resources after which 
improvements become smaller (Spilsbury et al, 2011). 
  
Other studies have explored not just the levels of staffing but other aspects of staffing provision.  Castle & 
Engberg (2007) examined how levels of staffing, turnover, worker stability and agency staff affected the 
quality of care in nursing homes. The research attempted to explore how different mixes of nurses affected 
the quality of care.  It is one of only a few studies to look at several aspects of the workforce, rather than a 
single element.   They found that high use of agency staff and low stability of workers are associated with 
lower quality.  These factors may be as significant as staffing levels.  Castle and Engborg (2007) suggest that 
rather than just setting minimum staffing levels, policy makers should consider that turnover, use of agency 
staff and stability of staff has an influence on quality of care.  These may be more difficult to regulate but 
use of agency staff may be used to maintain minimum staffing levels.  Agency staff may also cost more in 
the short term but they are not provided with training and other benefits, which will affect their long term 
quality. 
 
One of the limitations of the studies reviewed was that quality of care was limited to clinical outcomes 
rather than focusing on quality of life or specific social care indicators.  For example, quality of care is not 
defined in terms of how older people are supported in daily living in a respectful and empowering way.  
Wild et al (2010) found that there is limited research that examines the ‘voice’ of residents and quality of 
life indicators.  
 
There are also limitations in the way in which staffing levels are measured because they are assessed using 
data provided for a statutory reporting rather than actual numbers in residential homes, which may provide 
a different picture.  Another issue in assessing levels of staffing is that there is no breakdown of time spent 
on different types of caring activities, for example, direct caring or supervision.  In addition, levels of 
staffing needs to be broken down into the component parts of types of staff and use of agency staff, all of 
which will influence the nature of the relationship between care workers and older people.  
 
b) Ownership and health outcomes 
One of the largest studies to examine the relationship between quality of care and for-profit and not –for-
profit nursing homes, where a nursing home was defined as a home where most of the residents require 
daily nursing care (Comondore et al, 2009).  Of 82 studies that were reviewed, 40 studies showed 
statistically significant relationships between lower quality of care in for-profit homes as compared to not-
for- profit homes.  Three studies showed positive relationships between for-profit homes and high quality 
of care.  The remaining studies had less consistent findings.  Both for–profit and not-for-profit homes are 
paid fixed rates by the US government for residents, so both are faced with providing services at fixed 
rates.  For-profit homes have the additional payments to shareholders, taxes, and high salaries and bonuses 
to senior executives, which makes them work to minimise the expenditures of running homes.  This may 
lead to reduced levels of staffing.   
 
Hillmer et al (2005) also looked at the relationship between ownership and for-profits and quality of care in 
38 studies.  Using eight quality indicators to measure  quality of care, which included mortality, infections, 
pressure ulcers, hospitalizations, functional abilities, incontinence, dehydration, accidents, weight change, 
the review found that higher quality of care was found in not-for-profit homes.  Not-for-profit homes were 
associated with higher staff skill mix and lower turnover of nursing aides as compared to for-profit homes. 
 
Amirkhanyan (2008) examined the impact of privatisation of public nursing homes in the US, which looked 
at the changes from public to profit or not-for-profit.  It examined data from OSCAR, the national database 
maintain by the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) which is part of the quality assessment 
process for Medicaid/Medicare certified health care providers.  This study found that there was an increase 
in the number of violations of quality of life indicators when homes changed their status from ‘county-
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owned (public) to for-profit’.   Lower quality was also found in the for-profit group of homes.  Not-for-profit 
homes did not show a decline in quality of care provided after transfer from public ownership.   
 
Castle and Engberg (2007) also found that for-profit homes and high numbers of beds were associated with 
low quality of care.  They also found in an earlier study (2005) found that higher levels of competition were 
associated with lower levels of quality.    
  
Comondore et al. (2009) in the study of quality of care and for-profit homes did not explore differences 
between different types of for-profit, for example, chains versus non-chain and small business versus 
investor owned.   These differences need to be explored because in many countries, the for-profit sector is 
often fragmented, with large companies and small sized businesses co-existing.   Amirkhanyan (2008), in a 
study of homes transferred from public to profit/ not for profit, found that small for-profit homes had 
higher quality outcomes than larger for-profit homes.   A recent study in the UK, found that single homes 
have significantly better training outcomes than national or local chains of residential homes. This study 
also found that medium and large size homes had poorer recruitment and retention outcomes and higher 
perceived levels of staff absenteeism and staff turnover (Rubery et al, 2011).   
 
Although several studies show that there is a relationship between ownership and quality, they do not 
explain the nature of this relationship.  It may be related to cost structures and the need for for-profit 
homes to generate profits but it may also be influenced by the type of residents.  Some studies have found 
that residents had higher rates of mortality, infections and dehydration when they had not had family 
visitors in the previous month (Chou, 2002).   Not-for-profit homes may be more effective in creating a 
positive atmosphere which supported a sense of well-being.  
 
There is a consistent finding that staffing levels and quality of care are linked.  For-profit homes are more 
likely to reduce staffing levels as a way of reducing costs and overall expenditure.  For-profits often charge 
residents for additional services whereas not-for-profit homes include these services in an overall package 
of care (CUPE, 2009).   
 
Much research has looked at the US experience and there are debates about how much this experience can 
be generalised to a European situation.  The implications of how types of ownership influence care 
outcomes are useful to highlight overall trends in many European countries. 
 
c) Quality of working conditions 
The studies discussed in the previous section show how health outcomes in care homes are strongly 
influenced by levels of staffing as well as the use of agency staff, staff turnover and other aspects of 
staffing.   This section will look at recent research that had looked at how the care workforce is influenced 
by changes in the way in which social care is delivered. 
 
A study of Nordic care workers (Kroger et al, 2009) found that although all care workers saw “their work as 
meaningful and significant” they also “experienced it as physically and mentally wearing”. The “threat of 
violence is very high among care workers in all four countries but it is highest in Finland”. Physical and 
mental strain of care workers contributed to the intention of workers to leave care work (Kroger et al, 
2009).  Overall, workers felt that to improve the quality of care services, more staff were needed, more 
time was needed to give older people better care and a balance of both residential and home care services 
were needed. 
 
In a further study of the Nordic region (Kroger, 2011), examined the effect of market based practices on the 
level of work satisfaction for care workers.   This was a large study that looked at the similarities and 
differences between four countries – Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway.  All four countries have 
introduced market arrangements into care services during the last two decades, to varying degrees.  
Competition has been considered to be a way of ensuring cost effectiveness. 
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The survey found the structure of the workforce was slightly different in the four countries.  The majority of 
care workers are women aged over 40 but Sweden has the largest proportion of men and migrant workers 
working in care.  Finland has care workers with the longest professional training and working in residential 
settings.  Finland and Sweden has a higher proportion of not-for profit and for-profit employers, with 
Finland having the higher proportion of for-profit providers.  Over 60% of respondents were affected by 
quality control systems, separation of needs assessments and presence of for-profit providers. The results 
showed that levels of work satisfaction were highest for care workers employed in either not-for-profit or 
public providers. Work satisfaction was positively associated with quality control, user choice and local for-
profit providers but it was adversely affected by the separation of needs assessment from provision, 
suggesting that the commissioning process can affect levels of work satisfaction.  
 
In the UK, the role of home care workers, or ‘personal assistants’ has moved from “being a low level, 
domestic function such as cleaning, cooking and shopping, towards a more personal and caring role that 
often intensive and was previously done by district nurses”. In the private sector, the pay and working 
conditions are poor.  This is described as “a 24/7 work pattern with no additional unsocial hours payments. 
Zero hours contracts are common. Workers are sometimes told that, where there is no work available, they 
must either go to other places, have the time deducted or taken as time they owe the employer” (UNISON, 
2010).    
 
CUPE (2009) highlighted the relationship between understaffing and poor working conditions and abuse 
and neglect of older people in care homes as well as physical and psychological violence against staff.  
Research has found that levels of violence experienced by care workers in Canada were higher than those 
experienced by care workers in the Nordic countries (CUPE, 2009). 
 
A study (Wild et al, 2010) funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in the UK has looked at the nature of 
the care workforce and the effectiveness of training in improving quality of care.   The study recognised 
that improving quality of care for care home residents depends on the capacity of care staff to support and 
work with health professionals in caring for older people because the care needs of many older people 
become more complex with age.   This shows that with demographic changes, the demand for caring 
change and care workers will require training to be able to work with health and other professionals to 
deliver appropriate care.    
 
One of the effects of training of care staff was to improve confidence and professionalism of staff as well as 
strengthening relationships between community nurses and GPs. The research recognises that it is still 
unclear what level of nursing care is needed.  However, better skilled care staff will be able to support older 
people to live independently for longer.  The report recognises that if staff are to be trained, there will have 
to be extra resources available for this.  It suggests that more income for care homes will have to be 
generated to pay for staff training which will increase the costs of care.  This is an important issue in a 
privatised service.   
 
Privatisation of social care in the UK as an example of market failure 
In the UK, the NHS and Community Care Act (1990) promoted subcontracting from local authorities to 
private providers by separating local authority purchasing and provider functions.  Initially, this led to an 
expansion of the private social care residential sector and a transfer of provision from local authorities to 
private residential homes. Between 1997 and 2002, the percentage of beds in local authority staffed homes 
fell from 24% to 14%.  The overall number of people in either local authority, private or non-profit staffed 
residential or nursing care home rose from 236,335 in 1997 to 259,490 in 2002.  By 2009, about 4% of older 
people lived in care or residential homes. About two thirds were funded by local authorities and a third 
were privately funded (Comas-Herrera et al, 2010). In the last five years there has been a move towards 
personalisation of budgets where the individual is given cash to purchase their own services 
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Private providers of care services often started as small businesses in the early 1990s, which could respond 
to user needs, but have been taken over by larger companies, which results in management being further 
away from the services being delivered.  Large, private sector care providers are often publicly limited 
companies that have to work to generate annual dividends for shareholders.   In recent years, private 
equity investors have bought social care companies, as part of long term investments. This has made the 
companies subject to the investment strategies of private equity funds, which are focused on a high rate of 
return for the investor rather than the needs of users.  
 
By 2010, residential care provision for older people was dominated by four companies, which are also 
involved in provision of mental health services and services for people with learning disabilities.  The public 
sector is the main purchaser of services.  Except for one non-profit company, these large providers of 
residential care all adopted a business model which was based on the ‘sale and leaseback’ of residential 
properties.  This involved using cheap credit to purchase residential homes, selling them and then leasing 
them back for use.  This was considered a flexible solution to the problem of property ownership, if the 
market for residential homes started to contract.  The success of this model was based on access to cheap 
credit and a growing demand for residential care.  
 
The financial crisis of 2008 started to undermine this business model.  Credit became more expensive and 
more difficult to access.  By 2010, with cuts in local authority budgets, the demand for places in residential 
care homes was decreasing.  Local authorities were also trying to reduce the price of residential care.  This 
can be described as a market contraction.  Care companies had to renegotiate their access to credit and the 
rents paid for the leased back care homes.  By 2011, one major private provider declared itself bankrupt 
after failing to negotiate reduction in rent payments.  Other providers have to renegotiate debt 
arrangements in 2012. 
 
This experience shows how vulnerable social care services are when provision is dominated by the private 
sector.  The aim of the private sector is to maximise profits.  For private equity investors, their aim is to 
maximise their investment.   The combination of these goals results in companies taking financial risks 
which do not consider the needs of people using their care services.  The TUC Commission on Vulnerable 
Employment (2008) found that care services, which had been privatised over the previous decade, showed 
how the terms and conditions of workers had deteriorated (TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment, 
2008). 
 
Decisions about residential homes are made far away from the communities in which they are based.  With 
the failure of at least one company, the local authorities that have commissioned services from this 
company are ultimately responsible for finding alternative care services.  This is the result of a failure of the 
privatisation of social care services.   Direct local authority provision of residential care services is very 
limited and so local authorities will be unable to provide their own services.  They will continue to be 
dependent on the private sector. 
 
Conclusion  
The privatisation of care services has affected both the quality of care and the quality of working 
conditions.   Research shows that there is a relationship between staffing levels and other factors related to 
workers employment, such as retention and use of agency staff, and the quality of care received by older 
people.  The experience of the US with a large private care sector, provides evidence that for-profit 
ownership has an effect on quality of care provided.  
 
Private sector investments and the use of unstable business models illustrates the problems of privatisation 
of older people’s care services and facilities.  There is a growing trend for a wider range of arrangements, 
for example, assisted living, supportive housing, retirement residences, that cover both living and caring 
arrangements for older people.  They are all subject to high levels of private sector investment and because 
they are not specifically care homes are not subject to care home regulations.  The care that is provided is 
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not as regulated as care or residential homes.  The potential impact of these different forms of privatisation 
of care and housing for older people can be seen in the case of the UK, where the pursuit of a business 
models based on risky property investments, funded through debt, has resulted in the closure of the largest 
social care company.  
 
 
Key points 
 There is a relationship between levels of staffing and quality of care 
 Other aspects of staffing, for example, use of agency staff, staff turnover, also affect 
quality of care 
 US research shows that quality of care delivered in many for-profit homes is lower 
than in not-for profit homes 
 More research is needed on impact of different sizes of homes and types of for-
profit companies on quality of care 
 Quality of life indicators are needed to assess how care is delivered as well as health 
outcomes 
 Work satisfaction affected by separation of commissioning of services from 
provision 
 UK experience shows failure of privatisation as example of market failure   
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9 South Africa: Health case study – Sandra van Niekerk 
 
South Africa is a country of huge inequalities, vast poverty and high unemployment. These factors have a 
profound impact on the state of health of the majority of the citizens of the country. The living conditions 
that the majority of people find themselves in, and its implications for their health is exacerbated by the 
unequal and inadequate health system that bedevils the country. The health system is inequitable with 
regard to the health service that are delivered, resources that are available, and the quality of the services 
(Engelbrecht & Crisp, 2010: 196). While the proportion of the GDP spent on health is relatively high – 8.3%, 
which is higher than in any other African country - most of this spending is concentrated in the private 
health system (Engelbrecht & Crisp, 2010: 196), with public health making up 4.2% of the GDP. This 4.2% 
covers 84% of the population, while the 4.1% spent in the private sector only covers 16.2% of the 
population (DOH, 2001). Thus a skewed perception of the state of health care in South Africa is given if only 
GDP figures are taken into account. 
 
The ANC government in 1994 inherited a fragmented health system. There was a public health sector 
financed from the national fiscus, and largely accessed by the black majority; as well as a private health 
sector which serviced the white minority, funded through medical aid schemes. The health system 
prioritised the hospital sector, which received over 80% of resources, while the primary health sector was 
underdeveloped. And there were 14 health departments – one for each of four different race groups, as 
well as one for each of the ten bantustans1. It was a system that sharply favoured urban over rural areas – 
with the private health care sector, as well as the public academic/tertiary hospitals, well developed in the 
main urban areas, while the rural areas lacked both infrastructure and medical staff. Even greater inequities 
crept into the system in the late 1980s when the rules of cross-subsidisation for medical aids was lifted, 
meaning medical aids could favour healthier and younger members; and the number of private hospitals 
increased substantially because the approval process for these hospitals was deregulated. This resulted in 
an 87% increase in private hospital beds between 1988 and 1993 (Schneider, Barron, Fonn, 2007: 292). 
“The new government inherited a reasonably well-resourced health system, able to offer quality 
services to segments of the population. However, it was also deeply inequitable, disorganised and 
inefficient, with powerful private sector interests and limited institutional intelligence in the form 
of knowledge and information to plan restructuring.” (Schneider, Barron, Fonn, 2007: 292) 
The new government had to try and overcome this legacy, and in the process of restructuring and 
integrating the 14 different health structures into one, take into account equity and social justice 
considerations.  
 
In addition the new government had to deal with the rapidly increasing rate of HIV/AIDS, as well as other 
major diseases such as tuberculosis; and it had to incorporate into the health system new policies put in 
place such as the right to the termination of pregnancy, and free medical care for children under six and 
pregnant women (Schneider, Barron, Fonn, 2007: 292). 
 
HIV/AIDS has had a profound impact on the health system and the health of the nation in general. It has 
meant that South African has become 1 of only 12 countries in the world where maternal mortality and 
mortality for children under five has increased since 1990 (Schneider, Barron, Fonn, 2007: 292). Currently, 
there are 69 deaths per 100 000 live births for children under five (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, Sanders & 
McIntyre, 2009). At the same time the number AIDS related deaths has been steadily increasing – from 3% 
in 1995 to 46% in 2005 (DBSA,  2008). 
                                                     
1
 Bantustans were established in South Africa as part of the apartheid government’s measures to 
create separate geographical areas, which were supposedly self-governing, for black people in 
South Africa.  
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Public sector health in South Africa 
In terms of the constitution, health is a concurrent function of the three spheres of government, and 
responsibility for health care is divided between a national Department of Health, nine provincial health 
departments, and local government. Generally the health policy introduced by the ANC government post 
1994 is progressive, with some key programmes introduced which have done much to address some basic 
health issues. However, there is a major problem with the implementation of the system as a whole, as well 
as with adequate funding of the system, with the result that the public health sector is in very poor shape.  
Post 1994, the ANC government developed an approach to the health care system which strove to unify the 
public health system, improve delivery, and ensure access to health services of all. Key elements of the new 
health system included: 
 The establishment and prioritisation of the Primary Health Care (PHC) approach; 
 The development of a district health system through which PHC would be rolled out; 
 A unified national health system incorporating both public and private sectors; 
 The reduction of inequities and the expanded access to essential health care (Schneider, Barron, 
Fonn, 2007: 292). 
The biggest reorientation of government policy in the health sector post 1994 was to emphasise the 
importance of the primary health care system, which consists of clinics, community health centres and 
district level hospitals. It is largely nurse driven, rather than doctor driven. The district health system was 
seen as the vehicle for delivering these services. This emphasis on primary health is an important departure 
from the situation that existed in apartheid South Africa.  
 
There have been a number of successful programmes introduced as part of PHC. The table below sets out 
some of these programmes: 
 
Examples of programmatic interventions since 1994 
Women Free health-care services for pregnant women 
 Choice on termination of pregnancy 
 Confidential enquiry into maternal deaths 
 Cervical cancer screening programme 
 Sexual assault services including post-exposure prophylaxis 
Children Free health care for children < 6 years 
 Primary school nutrition programme 
 Expanding the immunisation programme and mass campaigns 
 Integrated management of childhood illness programme 
HIV/AIDS Public education campaigns 
 Condom distribution 
 Voluntary counselling and testing 
 Treatment and surveillance of sexually transmitted infections 
 Community-based care and support programmes 
 Prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
 Comprehensive HIV & AIDS Care Management and Treatment Programme 
(incorporating ARV roll-out) 
Tuberculosis Implementation of the WHO-advocated ‘DOTS’[directly observed therapy, 
short course] policy 
 Improved national surveillance 
 Integration of HIV and TB 
Tobacco Legislation/regulations to control tobacco product advertising, promotion and 
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sponsorship 
 Increasing the price of tobacco products 
Malaria control Regional co-operation as part of the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative 
including Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa, involving household 
spraying, new arteminsinin-based drug regimens and improved surveillance 
Table reproduced from Schneider et al, 2007: 303 
 
Despite these successes, the public health sector faces many serious challenges. 
 
Quadruple burden of disease 
At the same time that the new government was looking at health policies designed to overcome the 
inequitable system of the past, HIV/AIDS and all its attendant illnesses, such as tuberculosis, emerged as a 
major health issue. Until the advent of HIV/Aids, South Africa had declining fertility and mortality rates, and 
increasing life expectancy. At this time, South Africa was regarded as having a triple burden of disease. Like 
other developing countries it had the double burden of disease. On the one hand it had diseases related to 
poverty, such as infectious and parasitic diseases like tuberculosis, lower respiratory infection, diarroheal 
disease and septicaemia, as well as malnutrition and perinatal and maternal conditions. On the other hand, 
it had diseases related to an unhealthy lifestyle (smoking, diet, stress, inadequate exercise) such as 
cardiovascular and metabolic diseases like strokes, heart disease and diabetes. The third leg of the triple 
burden of disease was high rates of injury and trauma.  
 
With the advent of HIV/AIDS, and the huge number of people affected by it, HIV/AIDS became the fourth 
leg of the ‘quadruple burden of disease’ currently facing South Africa (Bradshaw et al, 2006). It is estimated 
that 1 in 9 South Africans is HIV positive (DBSA, 2008). The HIV prevalence in the country is 23 times the 
global average (MOH, 2001). And the number of people with tuberculosis, strongly associated with 
HIV/AIDS, has increased from 269 per 100 000 population in 1996 to 720 per 100 000 population in 2006. 
This a trebling of the number of people with TB (DBSA, 2008). 
 
 This quadruple burden of disease places enormous stress on an already teetering health system. 
 
Problems relating to staffing 
One of the biggest constraints currently facing the public health sector is a lack of trained health personnel, 
particularly at the primary health care level, and even more particularly in the rural areas. But it is not only 
at the primary health level that staff shortages exist. As von Holdt and Murphy show, the public hospitals 
are under enormous pressure caused by staff shortages – both of support staff, as well as, crucially, nursing 
staff Von Holdt & Murphy, 2007). 
 
With 79% of doctors in private practice, there are too few doctors in the state health system. The same can 
be said for nurses – there are just too few to deal with the number of patients. Over the last 17 years many 
nurses have moved out of the public sector into the private sector, where conditions and remuneration are 
better, or have gone overseas to work. It is estimated that attrition through emigration is about 25% (DOH, 
2011: 6). The result has been a drop in the nurse-to-population ratio from 149 public-sector professional 
nurses to 100 000 population in 1998, to 110 per 100 000 population in 2007 (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron et 
al, 2009).. The situation has been exacerbated by the government’s decision in the late 1990s to close many 
of the nursing colleges. Attrition due to HIV/AIDS, which has affected 16% of the nursing profession, has 
also been a factor (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron et al, 2009). 
 
In 2005, there was a 27.1% vacancy rate of skilled health personnel (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron et al, 2009). 
The DBSA 10 point plan estimates that there is a shortfall between actual employment and the 
employment necessary if population growth is taken into account of 64 087; and a shortfall of 79 791 if 
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population growth and the disease burden is taken into account (DBSA, 2008). A challenge facing the 
government, therefore, is to train sufficient personnel, retain them in the public sector, and relocate them 
to work in the areas of greatest need – generally the rural areas.  
Another challenge relating to health personnel, and particularly nurses, is the pervasive perception of them 
as “harsh, unsympathetic and as readily breaching patient confidentiality (Schneider, et al, 2007: 299), and 
their relationship with patients being characterised as one of “rudeness , arbitrary acts of unkindness, 
physical assault, and neglect” (Coovadia, et al, 2009). This is a perception that has been around since the 
1950s. Attempts to understand this phenomenon have located explanations in the apartheid government’s 
socialisation of nurses as a “privileged social elite” (Coovadia, et al, 2009), whose task was not only to care 
for the sick, but also to perpetuate a hierarchical, authoritarian culture where nurses were subordinate to 
doctors, but had a great deal of authority over patients.  As Schneider, Barron and Fonn (2007) argue “little 
has changed in the culture of service provision in which the apartheid frameworks of patients as subjects to 
be disciplined, rather than rights- bearing citizens, still dominate( Schneider, Barron and Fonn (2007:299). 
 
At the same time, one of the reasons for the drain of health personnel from the public sector is the way 
that they are treated in the health workplace. Remuneration in the public sector is low, conditions are 
often poor, hours are long, and the morale of staff is low. A 2003 South African Medical Association study 
found that the way they were treated was the main reason doctors left the public sector  (Wolvaardt, et al, 
2008:15. Engelbrecht and Crisp identify a number of factors that have contributed to the poor 
organisational culture of the public health system. These include poor leadership and management in 
institutions, poor human resource practices, poor communication, stress, and high work burdens 
(Engelbrecht and Crisp, 2010). 
 
Problems with underperforming institutions 
Effective management of health services in the public sector has been an ongoing problem.  
Operational management is centralised, which makes it difficult for those on the ground to put in place 
adequate measures to deal with the situation they face on a day-to-day basis. 
The NHI Green Paper has noted that public health institutions have been underperforming because of 
“poor management, underfunding, and deteriorating infrastructure” (RSA, 2011: 9). 
 
Inequities in health care 
As has been previously indicated, there are vast inequities in the health system between the private and 
the public sector, as well as between rural and urban areas. 
Even within the public sector, inequities exist.  For instance, the care given in the different provinces is not 
equitable. This can be seen by the different success rates – while the Western Cape has a success rate of 
80% in curing TB, the success rate in KwaZulu Natal is only 40 – 60% (Engelbrecht & Crisp, 2010: 201). 
 
Lack of effective implementation of primary health care 
Despite a good primary health care policy, the primary health care system has not been effectively 
implemented. The establishment of the district health system, as the vehicle for implementing the primary 
health care system, has been messy and inconclusive – with a great deal of confusion and contestation 
around whether it should be responsibility of local government or provincial government. For instance, the 
local government trade unions, the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) and the 
Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) have opposed the shifting of responsibility for 
primary health care from local government to provincial government.  As Schneider, Barron and Fonn 
argue, the dispute about where best to locate primary health “has inhibited the establishment of the basic 
building block of the new health system and, with this, the basis for reorganizing the health sector as a 
whole” (Schneider, et al, 2007: 296). 
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There is still a great deal of emphasis on the tertiary level hospitals, which receive 30% of total public health 
expenditure (Schneider, et al, 2007: 296). 
 
Financing for the public health sector 
Prior to 1994 health services for the majority of South Africans were underfunded  - particularly in the 
bantustans. For instance, in 1986/87 health spending per head in the Transvaal was about R 150 and R 200 
in the Natal province and Cape province; while in the bantustans it ranged from R 23 in Lebowa to R 91 in 
Ciskei  (Coovadia, et al, 2009). 
 
The macroeconomic policy of GEAR (Growth, Employment and Reconstruction Policy), introduced in 1996, 
imposed fiscal constraints on the public sector, including the health system. Spending on public health 
services stagnated for a few years as a result, before starting to rise again after 2001. But, as Schneider, 
Barron and Fonn argue, even after the government had relaxed, to some extent, the tight fiscal constraints 
of the late 1990s, fiscal constraint continued to shape health services in the country. Cost-containment was 
clearly established as the driver of everyday practice in the health system.  
“Staying within budget became and remains the key preoccupation of managers, implicitly 
relegating equity and other dimensions of institutional change to secondary goals” (Schneider, et 
al, 2007: 297). 
 
With the increase in health spending over the last few years, there has in fact been a net real growth in 
public health expenditure since 1994. Health represents 12.1% of the total government expenditure 
(National Treasury, 2009). However, this expenditure has not kept up with the growth in the population, or 
with the increased demands made on the health system by HIV/AIDS  (Schneider et al, 2007).This is 
acknowledged in the NHI Green Paper, which states that “the public sector is under-resourced relative to 
the size of the population that it serves and the burden of disease” (RSA, 2011: 4).  The result is that 
government health care continues to be under-funded. To exacerbate the situation, public health services 
have been burdened with a number of unfunded mandates over the years, which act as a further drain on 
health resources. These unfunded mandates result from government structures being given additional 
health responsibilities, or health programme policies being changed, which requires additional or different 
services being provided, but the additional financing to do this not being provided.  However, the additional 
inflow of resources into the public health sector, and a focus on improving equity has resulted in the closing 
of the gap between provinces in the amount of money spent on public sector health services. From a five-
fold difference in 1992/93, the situation improved to a two-fold difference in 2005/06 (Coovadia, et al, 
2009). 
 
Privatisation of health services 
The implementation of privatisation takes many forms – as can be seen in the health sector in South Africa. 
These forms range from financial measures; to partnerships between the public sector and the private 
sector; and to NGOs, volunteers and so on filling the gap left when the state does not provide a service. All 
these forms are evident in the health sector in South Africa.  
 
The apartheid government promoted a policy of privatisation in the health services sector from the 1980s 
onwards – in line with international trends at that time. The result of this policy was that the number of 
private beds expanded hugely between 1988 and 1993. At the same time, the number of doctors working 
in the private sector increased rapidly from 40% at the beginning of the 1980s to 62% at the beginning of 
the 1990s(Coovadia, et al, 2009). This trend was not reversed with the advent of democracy in 1994, but 
has rather been consolidated over the last 17 years. For instance, by 2007, 79% of doctors in South Africa 
were in private practice(Coovadia, et al, 2009). The table below reflects the distribution of health care 
professionals between the public and private sector in 2004. While the data is old, the pattern it reveals is 
still relevant and reflective of the reality today. 
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 Total Public sector no. (%) Private sector no. (%) 
General Practitioners 19 729 5 398 (27.4%) 14 331 (72.6%) 
Specialists 7 826 1 938 (24.8%) 5 888 (75.2%) 
Dentists 4 269 316 (7.4%) 3 953 (92.6%) 
Pharmacists 4 410 1 047 (23.7%) 3 363 (76.3%) 
Psychologists 3 808 222 (5.8%) 3 586 (94.2%) 
Source: Wolvaardt, G; van Niftrik,  Beira, B et al (2008) pg. 231 
 
With the private health sector absorbing a great deal of the health resources (such as the large numbers of 
doctors and nurses), the ability of the public health system to respond to the health needs of the country is 
severely restricted (Chopra et al, 2009). With the expansion of private hospitals in the late 1980s/early 
1990s, which happened at the same time as budgetary constraints were being imposed in the public sector, 
there was a concomitant decline in the conditions at public hospitals. 
 
There has been an increasing number of people who are accessing health services, particularly health 
services related to HIV/AIDS and related illnesses such as tuberculosis, through the private sector, because 
the public sector is simply unable to meet the demand. Some of these health services are provided on a 
not-for-profit basis, either through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community based 
organisations (CBOs) or faith based organisations (FBOs), who are funded by donors; or through employee 
assistance programmes. There are a massive number of NGOs, CBOs and FBOs working in South Africa, 
although the exact number can’t be established because there is no requirement for such organisations to 
register with the Department of Welfare (Wolvaardt, et al, 2008: 225). 
 
One example of donor money being provided to private sector organisations is that of the United States 
President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). PEPFAR has provided grants worth $856.8 million 
for AIDS prevention and treatment work in South Africa. It makes this money available to private sector 
organisations, many of whom provide support to provincial government initiatives through public-private 
partnerships. The money is spent on programmes such as supporting individuals on antiretroviral (ARV) 
treatment; caring for and supporting HIV positive people; caring for and supporting vulnerable children and 
orphans affected by HIV/AIDS; testing people for HIV; running awareness and education (Wolvaardt, et al, 
2008: 224). 
 
There is also a large body of community carers, who either act as volunteers, or receive some kind of 
remuneration, that has emerged as part of response to HIV/AIDS – they act as counsellors, treatment 
supporters, home-based carers, and support group facilitators. Their work is largely co-ordinated and 
funded by NGOs, and there is little standardisation of what they do, how they do it, whether they get paid, 
and how much they get paid. In 2004 the government established the National Community Health Worker 
Policy Framework to regulate training and remuneration of these workers (Schneider et al, 2007: 304). They 
are paid a stipend by provinces who channel the funding through various NGOs. 
 
Partly the inflow of donor money and the establishment of employee assistance programmes in the 
workplace can be understood in the context of the Mbeki government’s failure to deal adequately with the 
HIV/AIDS crisis. It is only in the last three years, since Dr Motsoaledi became the Health Minister, that a 
more coherent government response to the crisis has been developed. The HIV & AIDS and STI National 
Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2007 – 2011, sets out such a response, and was developed through 
cooperation between the government and civil society in the health sector. 
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The private sector, both the for-profit and not-for-profit components, are involved in a whole range of 
activities that form part of primary health care. These include: 
 the promotion of a healthy lifestyle and other health issues; 
 ensuring adequate food supplies, nutrition, adequate water and sanitation; 
 family planning, maternal and child care; 
 immunisation; 
 prevention and control of locally endemic disease; 
 appropriate treatment of common diseases; 
 promotion of mental, emotional and spiritual health; 
 the provision of essential drugs  ((Wolvaardt, et al, 2008: 225). 
A health road-map, commissioned by the ANC Health and Education Committee of the National Executive 
Council, and co-ordinated by the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) came up with a 10-point plan to 
guide health policy and, specifically, to identify “opportunities for coordinated public and private health 
sector efforts towards improved access to affordable, quality healthcare in South Africa.” In other words, 
bringing in the private sector to assist with all the problems and obstacles bedevilling the health system 
was an explicit thrust of the 10-point plan. The plan calls for the private sector to take up the slack in the 
health system – and increase its “catchment population” which is currently at 7.5million. This would then 
create “fiscal space” of roughly R 12 billion for the public sector. In other words, it would save the public 
sector R 12 billion if more people, either through medical aids, or out of their own pockets, paid for private 
health care. 
 
One of the “10 points” called for additional capacity and expertise to be brought in “to strengthen a result-
based health system, particularly at the district level (including revised legislation to recruit foreign skills, 
partnerships with private and public sector, deployment and training for district health management 
teams, etc.)” (DBSA, 2008).  Other roles that the 10-point plan envisages for the private sector include 
training of new health personnel, particularly nurses; and the rehabilitation of public hospitals. 
In 1999, the National Department of Health established a PPP Task Team, which has overseen the 
introduction of a number of PPPs in the health sector.  For example, the BioVac Institute is a public-private 
partnership between the National Department of Health and the BioVac Consortium. The National 
Department of Health has a 40% shareholding in the BioVac Institute. BioVac is the only human vaccine 
producing facility in the country.  When the PPP was established, the National Department of Health 
transferred the staff assets of the State Vaccine Institute to BioVac  (Wolvaardt, et al, 2008: 232). 
Public-Private Partnerships have also been established in hospitals. Until recently, they were mainly 
focused on the management of hospitals, but recently have included infrastructure rehabilitation  and 
upgrades. The government’s intention is to enter into partnerships, for up to 20 years, to maintain 
equipment and facilities, as well as partnerships to provide clinical services.2 
 
The main private sector company partnering with government is Life Esidimeni, which is part of the Life 
Healthcare group. Currently Life Esidimeni runs 12 hospitals jointly with the national or provincial 
Departments of Health and Social Services. These include a TB hospital and two district hospitals. Other 
PPPs include a hospital care contract between a company called the Clinix Hospital Group and the Gauteng 
Province; and two PPPs run with Netcare (Wolvaardt et al, 2008). Netcare is positioning itself to take on 
more PPPs by offering to partner with government in the implementation of the National Health Insurance 
(NHI), which the government is in the process of developing (see conclusion)3. 
 
In terms of PPPs for infrastructure upgrading and rehabilitation, the government has targeted 5 hospitals 
for upgrading, and 1 newly built hospital. The upgrading of these hospitals and building of a new one form 
                                                     
2
 South Africa;  Public-Private Partnerships Offer New Hope for Ailing Health Sector  Africa News, March 23, 2010 
Tuesday, 929 words, Business Day (Johannesburg) 
3
 “Netcare offers its expertise to help implement NHI by 2012” Business Report 17 February 2011 
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part of the envisaged role out of the NHI (RSA, 2011:49). The aim is for construction work on these projects 
to begin by 2012. The targeted hospitals are the Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto, the George 
Mkhari Academic Hospital in Pretoria, the King Edward Hospital in Kwa-Zulu Natal, the Nelson Mandela 
Academic hospital in the Eastern Cape and a new hospital, the Limpopo Academic hospital, which will be 
built in Polokwane (National Treasury, 2009).  According to Tumisang Moleke, Acting Head of the National 
Treasury PPP Unit “this is the first time such a suite of services is being proposed for public hospital PPPs: 
design construction, facilities management and operations management as required. Transaction advisors 
will be investigating clinical and medical technology issues. We will consider all options: design and 
construction as usual, but also hard and soft facilities management, medical equipment supply and IT 
management and systems.” 
 
Another form of PPP that occurs in the health sector is that of co-location PPPs. With co-location PPPs the 
private sector and the public sector exist side-by-side, delivering a similar service without competing. For 
instance, in some public hospitals around the country, where the public sector is not making use of all the 
beds available, a section of the hospital is given over to the private sector to run at a profit. They pay over 
some revenue to the public sector – supposedly representing a “win-win” situation for both the public and 
private sectors. A number of these co-location PPPs exist. For example: 
 Pelonomi and Universitas Hospital in Bloemfontein 
 Kouga Partnership Hospital which consists of Humansdorp District Hospital and Isivivana Private 
Hospital. This partnership involved the refurbishment of Humansdorp Hospital and the 
construction of the Isivivana Private Hospital. The PPP is with Life Healthcare, and has a concession 
period of 20 years. 
 
Not surprisingly, the trade unions are opposed to public-private partnerships, believing that the 
government should rather focus on building capacity in the public sector. According to Sydney Kgara, head 
of policy at the National Health, Education and Allied Workers Union "Partnerships lead to outsourcing, and 
when that happens there is a deterioration of conditions of service. People are often re-employed with 
fewer benefits, and we are concerned about people being retrenched."4 
 
Private sector health system 
The private sector health system consists of both not-for-profit, as well as for-profit sectors. The not-for-
profit component is largely provided by NGOs and employee assistance programmes. For-profit private 
health care is largely funded through medical aids. Post 1994, the government has attempted to tighten 
regulations in the medical aid sector again, after the loosening of controls seen in the 1980s. This was 
largely done through the establishment of a stronger Council for Medical Schemes, which regulated private 
sector financing. Cross-subsidisation was re-established so that medical aids could no longer discriminate 
against the old and sick and medical aid became more accessible; and a system of prescribed minimum 
benefits (PMB) was introduced. In terms of this system, medical aid schemes are required to cover 270 
specific diagnosis and treatment interventions, as well as 25 common chronic diseases. Despite the 
attempts to tighten up the medical aid terrain, the costs in this sector are still very high, and it services an 
increasingly smaller portion of the population. 
 
Those who have access to private health care, have access to much better resourced health care than is 
available in the public sector. While less than 15% of the population are members of private medical 
schemes, these schemes are responsible for 46% of health care expenditure. On the other hand, 64%of the 
population are dependent on the public health system. 21% of the population uses a combination of 
private and public health care- private care, which they pay for privately for primary health care, and the 
public sector for hospital care (Coovadia, et al, 2009).  In fact, the number of people accessing private 
health care, without being members of medical aid schemes has been increasing since 1994 (Wolvaardt et 
                                                     
4
 South Africa;  Public-Private Partnerships Offer New Hope for Ailing Health Sector  Africa News, March 23, 2010 
Tuesday, 929 words, Business Day (Johannesburg) 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
9 September 2011  Page 58 of 82 
al, 2008:224).  Whereas about R 9500 is spent per person per year for those with private medical aid, about 
R 1 300 is spent per person per year in the public sector (Coovadia, et al, 2009). This illustrates very 
graphically the extent of the inequalities in health care in South Africa.  
The private hospital sector is dominated by three large companies - Life Healthcare, Netcare and Medi-
Clnic, which together command 75% of the market5. Life Healthcare listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange last year. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was one of the big investors involved. The 
IFC is part of the World Bank Group. It has a 5% equity stake in Life Healthcare, and has also jointly financed 
a subsidiary company of Life Healthcare to take forward its plans for international expansion6. According to 
the IFC, one of its strategic priorities is to support health providers working across countries and regions “to 
reach lower-income groups”7. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite increases in health expenditure over the last 17 years, and the introduction of sound, progressive 
health policy, South Africa continues to be dogged by a public health system that is simply not meeting the 
health needs of the vast majority of South Africans. Partly the weakness of the health system can be traced 
back to the attempts by the government to extend more equitable health services to all, at a time when 
HIV/AIDS was becoming a major issue, causing large numbers of people to enter the increasingly strained 
health system. But the weaknesses can also be attributed to the neo-liberal approach to health care 
adopted by the government, an approach consistent with the macro-economic policy (GEAR) that the 
government introduced in 1996. 
As Schneider, Barron & Fonn argue: 
“With hindsight, it is clear that the context of health sector reform post-1994 has been an 
unfavourable one on several fronts. Apart from the constraints imposed by an overwhelming 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and an emerging human resource crisis, transformation began in the midst of 
international  health systems thinking that was neo-liberal and technocratic in orientation, 
emphasising, for example, new public management techniques, health-care packages targeting the 
poor (rather than redistribution), and outsourcing (rather than strengthening) of public sector 
functions”  (Schneider et al, 2007: 305).  
Government acknowledges the failure to transform the health sector since 1994, noting that instead of a 
reformed system, what has been entrenched is a “two-tiered health system, public and private, based on 
socioeconomic status”, which “continues to perpetuate inequalities”  (RSA, 2011: 5).   
 
In an attempt to overcome the problems of the bedevilling the public health system, ensure access of all to 
affordable, quality health services, and increase equity in the health sector by removing the two tier health 
system, the government is planning to introduce a National Health Insurance (NHI). The NHI Green Paper, 
released on 5 August 2011, begins to set out the details of what this new system will look like.  
The NHI is intended to bring about improvements in the health care provided by the public sector, through 
its emphasis on primary health care, and the strengthening of the three pillars of primary health care 
delivery – at district level, ward level and school level. Primary health care will be supplemented by a 
network of hospitals at different levels ranging from district level through to specialised hospitals. It is 
envisaged that the full implementation of the NHI will take 14 years. 
 
Despite recognizing, in line with the 200 World Health Report of the World Health Organisation (WHO),  
that “uncontrolled commercialism” “undermines principles of health as a public good” (RSA, 2011: 9); and 
despite the envisaged strengthening of the public sector, the Green Paper does provide for the private 
                                                     
5
 HEALTH. Bring us your sick  Financial Mail (South Africa), March 23, 2007, ECONOMY, BUSINESS & FINANCE; Pg. 
42, 940  words, Shoks Mzolo 
6
 IFC and South Africa's Life Healthcare to Expand Health Coverage in Emerging Markets  African Press Organization, 
June 10, 2010 Thursday 7:05 PM EST, 469 words 
7
 IFC and South Africa's Life Healthcare to Expand Health Coverage in Emerging Markets  African Press Organization, 
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sector to play a key role in the new system. Under the NHI healthcare will be provided through accredited 
and contracted public and private providers  (RSA, 2011: 19). There will also continue to be private sector 
involvement through mechanisms such as PPPs to upgrade, as well as build new hospitals.  The plans to 
refurbish five hospitals around the country and build a completely new hospital, the Limpopo Academic 
Hospital in Polokwane forms part of the implementation plans of the NHI. 
In part, the role of the private sector in the NHI is an acknowledgement of an existing situation, with the 
private sector already playing a large role in the South African health system. This role has increased rather 
than decreased since 1994, not only because the private health sector itself has grown (with increasing 
numbers of medical personnel in the private sector, increased numbers of private hospitals, and the 
consolidation of the medical aid schemes into fewer, larger schemes), but also because of the privatisation 
of different aspects of health care. This has included: 
 public-private partnerships (PPPs) for, among other things, the refurbishment of hospitals; 
 co-location PPPs, where the public and private sectors occupy the same hospital, or adjacent 
hospitals; 
 the provision of health services that the government is not providing, by the private sector (either 
for-profit or not-for-profit). This is particularly the case in the area of HIV/Aids treatment. 
The thinking of the NHI seems to be that the best way of drawing on the capacity and resources of the 
private sector, while at the same time curtailing the rampant profit-making in this sector, is to pool 
resources and set up a single-payer system through the NHI Fund. The National Health Insurance Fund, to 
be set up at an arm’s length from the Department of Health, as a separate entity, wholly owned by the 
government, will have the role of pooling funds and buying in health services for the whole population from 
both contracted private, as well as contracted public health care providers.  Payment for these services will 
be made by the NHI Fund on the basis of a  risk-adjusted capitation system which is meant to both avoid 
the dangers of over-servicing, which results from a fee-for-services based approach, as well as be a way of 
containing costs.  These public health care providers will include the Department of Health itself, through 
its national, provincial and district level structures and facilities.  
 
The role of the private sector in the public health system  is justified on the basis that government has 
many competing demands on it, it is unlikely to get more resources and therefore it needs to adopt a 
number of different strategies, among them collaboration with the private sector (DOH, 2011: 5). 
Already the major private hospital groups are positioning themselves to enter into PPPs with the 
government, or to strengthen their existing presence in the PPP field. Life Healthcare already has entered 
into a number of PPPs with the government;  and in its 2010 annual report, Netcare indicated that “we are 
ready and willing to share our knowledge and partner with government to leverage health-care spend 
effectively and so broaden avenues of access.”8 
 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest trade union federation in the country, in 
responding to the Green Paper has welcomed the introduction of the NHI, but at the same time, has noted 
its concern about the envisaged role for the private sector. One of its concerns relates to the ongoing role 
for medical aids that the Green Paper sets out. When the idea of the NHI was first mooted in 2007, the 
private medical aid schemes were among the most vociferous critics. There is now concern among 
organisations like COSATU and other progressive analysists , that the Green Paper is pandering too much to 
the fears and concerns of the private sector, and has made too many concessions to private sector 
interests. For example, the Green Paper raises the possibility that instead of a single-payer system, there 
could be a multi-payer system. This means that instead of the NHI Fund being the only body that can pay 
health care providers for services provided (single-payer system), medical aids under a multi-payer system 
could also pay providers and be re-imbursed by the NHI Fund. This will mean that the economic  clout of 
the medical aid schemes will continue under the new system. 
 
                                                     
8
 Business Report (17/2/2011) “Netcare offers its expertise to help implement NHI by 2012” 
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COSATU has also noted its concern that private sector healthcare providers will be able to choose whether 
to contract with the state or not.”9.  The private sector health sector is firmly entrenched in South Africa, 
and it remains to be seen whether the NHI can both improve the public health services sufficiently, and 
bring the private health sector in line. In giving such a large role in the NHI to the private sector, there is the 
danger that the plans for the NHI might ultimately undermine what the NHI is planning to achieve – that of 
an equitable and universal health system. 
 
                                                     
9
 Cosatu (11 August 2011) “NHI Green paper welcomed” 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/pr/2011/pr0811b.htmlm  
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10  A  Profile of the Public and Private Health Sectors in Brazil – Rita 
Fernandes & Jane Lethbridge 
 
This case study presents a profile of the increasing role of the private sector in the delivery of health 
services in Brazil, through the development of health care markets.  It starts with a demographic and health 
profile of Brazil and an account of the role of the health sector in the economy.   
 
Brazil – demographic and health profile 
Brazil is divided into 26 Federal States, 1 Federal District and 5.565 municipalities.  
 
 
Brazil has a population of 190,732,694 inhabitants.  The age structure of the population is changing with a 
decline in the percentage of children under 5 (11.3 to 8.9%) and an increase in men (6.8% to 8.3%) and 
women (7.8% - 10.0%) aged 60 and above in the period 1991 to 2005(WHO, 2007).   Life expectancy is 70 
years for men and 77 years for women (2005). 
Gross national income per capita is $10,160.  5.7% of the population are classified as living in extreme 
poverty, with 13.5 in rural areas and 4.2% in urban areas. The rate of un-employment was 9.3% in 2005 
(WHO, 2007).   
 
The leading causes of death are cerebrovascular diseases (10.1%), ischemic-cardiac diseases (9.7%), 
homicides (5.4%), diabetes (4.4%), chronic respiratory diseases (4.3%), influenza and pneumonia (4.2%), 
road accidents (3.9%), heart failure (3.6%), perinatal problems (3.5%) and hypertensive diseases (3.4%) 
(WHO, 2007).  Infant mortality fell from 33.7/1000 in 1996 to 22.6/1000 in 2004 (WHO, 2007).    
 
Unified Health System (SUS) 
The National Health Policy is based on the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, which sets out the 
principles and directives for the delivery of health care in the country, through the Unified Health System 
(SUS). Under the Constitution, the activities of the federal government are to be based on four year plans 
approved by the National Congress.  
 
The implementation process of the SUS aims to improve health in the whole country, with an emphasis on 
a reduction in child mortality.  The National Health Plan prioritizes measures to ensure access to activities 
and services to improve care, and to consolidate the decentralization of SUS management.  
 
The current legal provisions which have governed the organization arrangements of the Brazilian Health 
System, established in 1996 aim to shift responsibility of SUS administration to municipal governments.  
Technical and financial cooperation remain the responsibility of the Federal government and federal states.  
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Healthcare in Brazil is provided by both private and public institutions. The Brazilian Ministry of Health and 
its National Agencies are responsible for national health policies. The Federal Government is responsible for 
Primary Health Care but health institutions are administered by each Federal States of Brazil. 
 
The SUS provides health services to 75% of the population.  25% of the population receive services through 
the Supplementary System, where people also have the right to access services provided by the SUS.   
 
In Brazil, 7.9% of GDP is spent on health care, with 48.1% financed by the public sector and 51.9% financed 
by the private sector.  This percentages financed by the public sector has decreased since 1981.  In 2005, a 
third of private sector expenditure is from companies providing health services or insurance for employees.  
Two thirds of private sector expenditure is self-financed by individuals and families (WHO, 2007).   Out of 
pocket spending increased from 9% in 1981 to 19% in 2009.  Although the out of pocket expenditure as a 
percentage of total household expenditure is similar for lowest income groups (5.83%) and high income 
groups (8.31%), the low income groups buy medicines and the high income groups buy private health plans 
and insurance (Paim et al, 2011) 
 
In terms of health care activities/ services, public health care represents approximately 34.21% of GDP in 
this sector, while private sector services represents 65.79% of GDP, with 60.79% of GDP in the for profit 
sector.  The private sector consists of companies that are engaged in the following activities:  
Other Activities Related to Health Care (21.05%) 
Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products (13.36%)  
Trade in Pharmaceuticals (12.28%) and  
Hospital Care Activities (8.77%)   
The majority are for-profit companies. 
 
Financing of health services 
Health services are financed through general taxes, taxes for specific social programmes, employer health 
care spending and out-of pocket spending.  Tax collection from federal taxes for the health sector rose from 
R$ 7.6 billion (Reais) in 2003 to R$ 17.4 billion in 2009, showing an increase in resources for the sector 
(Secretariat of Federal Revenue of Brazil).  However, the transfer of Federal Government funds to the state 
and municipal levels for the health sector is only financed by tax revenues and no other sources of revenue, 
for example specific social programme funding.  Funding for the SUS has not been enough to guarantee 
adequate resources for the public system.  Even when a social programme was set up for the health sector, 
funding is often diverted.  In 1997 a new social programme, ‘The Provision Contribution on Financial 
Transactions’, was designed for extra health funding.  By 2006, 40% of the funding raised through this 
scheme was used for paying interest and public debts (Paim et al, 2011). 
 
Trade in health services and products 
An indication of the commercialisation of health services and related products can be seen in the increase 
in the number of number of wholesale and retail establishments selling pharmaceutical, medical, 
orthopaedic, dental and veterinary products between 1996 and 2005. The total number of establishments 
increased from 60,626 to 87,222.  The number of retail establishments increased from 56,172 to 78,356  
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Department of Research, Coordination of Services 
and Trade – Annual Trade Survey 1996 – 2005).  Brazil imports more health related good than it exports.  
Imports are predominantly pharmaceuticals, medical and dental equipment and medical instruments. 
 
Between 2000 and 2005, imports of goods and health services accounted on average for 4.2% of total 
imports of the whole country. While the export sector fluctuated less than the import sector, it was only 
responsible for 0.6% of exports of the whole country.  However, its rate of increase between 2002 and 
2005, was faster than for the health import sector (IBGE). 
 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
9 September 2011  Page 63 of 82 
Health services 
Health services in Brazil are provided by a mix of public and private providers, which are mainly financed 
through private funds.  There are three main sectors:  
 the public sector, the SUS, finances and provides services through federal, state and municipal 
levels, including the military health services;  
 the private (for profit and non-profit) sector financed through public and private funds and:  
 the private health insurance sector financed through health insurance plans. 
The private sector has traditionally been protected by the government, which has encouraged the 
privatisation of medical practices (Paim et al, 2011). 
 
Currently there are 212.468 Health Services registered in the Brazilian Ministry of Health. Of these, 151.763 
are private and 60.705 are public. Public Health Services are delivered at municipal level (58.055), state 
(2.401) and federal (249).   There are 6,742 hospitals in Brazil (Brazil Ministry of Health). Of this total, 70% 
are private hospitals. Public hospitals are divided by level of government as follows: 21% Municipal 
hospitals, 8% State hospitals and just 1% Federal hospitals. These hospitals provide 498,562 beds, with 
362,368 belonging  to SUS and 136.194 are non-SUS (Brazil Ministry of Health).  In contrast, the number of 
private health care facilities is twice that of public health care facilities.  Between 1999 and 2005, the 
number of healthcare facilities - public and private - increased from 56,133 in 1999 to 77,004 in 2005.    
 
There have also been changes in the public-private provision of in-patient health facilities.  
58.6% of health facilities were owned by the SUS public sector and 41.4% were in the private sector.  A 
small percentage of the private sector beds are contracted by SUS.  An 8.3% reduction in the total number 
for inpatient health facilities between 1999 and 2005 can be attributed to a decrease in the number of in-
patient health facilities run by the private sector and in the private beds that are accredited to SUS.  At the 
same time, there was an increase of 4.1% in the number of inpatient beds in public facilities.  Some of these 
changes can be explained by the trend towards moving from in-patient care to out-patient care.  Out-
patient care is cheaper to provide.   
In-patient health facilities by sector,1999-2005 
 
YEAR  
 
TOTAL Public Sector  Private 
Sector of 
SUS  
Private 
Sector 
non-SUS  
Total Private 
Sector  
1999 484,945 143,074 284,493 57,378 341,871 
2002 471,171 146,319 269,028 55,824 324,852 
2005 443,210 148,966 241,578 52,666 294,244 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Department of Population and Social 
Indicators Research 1999-2005 Medical-Healthcare Professionals 
 
Clinical Specialties offered at Health Facilities (2005) 
 
Specialty Public health service Private health 
services of SUS 
Private health 
services non-SUS 
Family Doctors Care  20 240 70 11 
Cardiology   2 065 1 048 2 374 
General Surgery   4 404 2 283 1 592 
Medical Clinic  11 550 2 818 3 890 
Dermatology  964 333 1 624 
Emergency  2 654 2 212 1 136 
Endocrinology 418 187 854 
Gastroenterology  546 521 1 289 
Gynaecology  10 100 2 613 3 880 
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Haematology  160 105 151 
Obstetrics  6 928 2 278 1 961 
Dentistry   19 006 557 3 810 
Paediatrics   10 268 2 547 3 180 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Department of Population and Social 
Indicators Research 2005 Medical-Healthcare Professionals 
 
Although the private sector has a larger number of clinical facilities then the public sector, there are some 
significant differences between public and private sector provision of certain specialties.  Almost all family 
doctor care is provided by the public sector.  For medical clinics and dentistry, there is a more significant 
private sector provision.   In some specialties, for example, dermatology, endocrinology, gastro-enterology, 
the private provision is greater than the public provision.  This shows that certain specialities are more 
attractive to the private sector, usually because they can be arranged as a series of tests and interventions, 
which can be separately costed.  Family doctor care is a much wider specialty which covers a range of 
conditions and is not easy to separate into different costed elements. 
 
Private health plans 
In 2008, 26% of the Brazilian population had private health insurance.  Civil servants have their own health 
insurance (Paim et al,2011).  Although private health insurance plans have been in existence in Brazil for 
almost 40 years, it was only in 1998 that there was any attempt to regulate them. Law No. 9.656 of June 03, 
1998 established standards for companies in this sector. In 2000, the National Agency for Supplementary 
Health (ANS) was created by the Brazilian Ministry Of Health, which aimed to regulate the private health 
insurance and the private health care sector. 
 
From 2000 to 2005, the number of people holding private health insurance plans grew by 11%, to 34 million 
policy holders.  There are regional differences in private health care plan coverage.  In the State of São 
Paulo, located in the Southwest Region of Brazil,  35,7% of its population is covered by private health 
insurance. On the other hand, Roraima state, located in the Northern Region, has a 2.3% coverage, the 
lowest rate of any Brazilian region.  Of the total number of private health insurance holders in Brazil, 42.5% 
are in the  State of São Paulo and 13.4% in the  State of Rio de Janeiro,  both in the Southwest Region of 
Brazil. 
 
All private health insurance companies have to work to agreed rules and  procedures, which are reviewed 
regularly.  Non-compliance of rules leads to the payment of fines. This form of regulation has contributed 
to a reduction in  the numbers of companies. In 2005, there were 1.260 healthcare insurance operators.  
 
Private health care companies 
In 2004, there were 78,000 private health care companies in Brazil.  They can be classified as: 
66.87% Out-patient services run by physicians and dentists 
17.87% Diagnostic testing and therapy 
10.21% Hospital care 
2.77% health insurance 
1.40% manufacture of instruments 
0.88% manufacture of medicines 
Over 50% of these companies are concentrated in the south-east of Brazil, with Sao Paulo (27.58%), Minas 
Gerais (13.3%) and Rio de Janeiro (11.12%). 
  
There are currently 1.748 health insurance companies (operating) in Brazil, of which 1,259 cover medical 
and hospital care services and 489 cover dental services (.National Agency for Supplementary Health (ANS).  
The majority (61%) of health insurance companies operate in the South East region, the region with highest 
incomes.  Only 3% of companies operate in the North region, which is the poorest region.   
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Of the 1017 companies, 8.2% provide plans and insurance to 80.3% of people with health insurance.  
Demand is influenced by income and occupation.  Some people with private health plans also use the SUS 
system, receiving vaccines, high cost services and procedures such as renal dialysis and transplants.  In this 
sense, the public SUS sector is subsidising the private health insurance sector (Paim et al, 2011). 
 
Labour 
The health care sector is highly labour intensive, especially for in-patient care.  This section shows the 
expansion of jobs that has taken place in the health care sector in the period 2003 - 2008.   The total 
number of jobs increased from 900,000 in 2003 to 1.18 million in 2008, with approximately 45% in the 
private sector.  The majority of health care workers work in the hospital sector and this has remained 
unchanged during this period.  The majority of health care workers are located in the three south eastern 
states, with the highest incomes.  This expansion of health workers has been enabled by the expansion of 
private sector higher education which has expanded the places available to train health professionals (Paim 
et al, 2011).   
 
Number of workers by sector/ services in 2003 and 2008 
 
Sector/ service Number 
of health 
workers 
2003 
% of total 
health 
workers 
Number of 
health 
workers 2008 
% of total 
health 
workers 
Hospital care 614,528 67.55 800,762 61.74% 
Out-patient clinics – medical and 
dental 
99,306 10.92 182,806 14.10 
Diagnostic testing and therapy 82,235 9.04 121,630 9.38 
Health insurance companies 
Manufacturing of instruments/ 
materials medical and dental use 
15,053 4.69 71,165 5.49 
Manufacture of medicine 55,892 1.65 73,665 5.68 
Total 909.675  1,296,922  
 
The geographical distribution of health workers 
 
State % (2003) %(2008) 
Sao Paulo 34.79 35.86 
Rio de Janeiro 11.17 11.15 
Minas Gerais 11.32 11.01 
Rio Grande do Sul 8.58 7.91 
Parana 5.44 5.74 
Bahia 4.67 4.37 
 
The majority of health workers are located in the three south east states, where there is also the greatest 
concentration of private health care services.  A smaller percentage of health workers are located in the 
poorer regions, for example Bahia and Parana.  The geographical distribution has not changed significantly 
in the period 2003-2008. 
 
Conclusion 
Brazil has a national health policy, which is part of the 1988 Constitution.  The federal government has 
overall responsibility for national health policy although implementation is the responsibility of municipal 
governments.  The public provision of health care services, through the SUS, does not meet the needs of 
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the whole population.  There is growing evidence that the private sector is playing an increasing role in the 
provision of health care, especially in different clinical specialties.     There has been an increase in out-of-
pocket spending for all income groups.   Private sector provision, whether as health services or health 
insurance, is concentrated in the south-east of the country, which is the most economically prosperous.        
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11 State involvement in private health care in Malaysia – Jane 
Lethbridge 
 
 
This case study will examine how the private health care sector in Malaysia has developed over the past 
thirty years. It will outline the demographic and health profile of Malaysia before discussing changes in the 
public and private health care systems.  The impact of the change on public sector health workers will be 
discussed as well as reactions by civil society organisations.   
 
Demographic and health profile  
Malaysia has a population of 28.3 million.  With 31.8% of the population aged below 15 years, it has a 
relatively large young population. 63.6% of the population are aged 15-64 years.  4.6% of the population is 
65 years or older.  Life expectancy has increased over the last 50 years and is now 71 years for men and 76 
years for women.  Per capita income is 6,725$, with only 6% of the population living in poverty (WHO, 
2009). 
 
The five leading diseases in Malaysia are ischaemic heart disease followed by mental illness, cerebro-
vascular disease/stroke, road traffic injuries and cancers, suggesting that the country is moving towards a 
predominantly high rate of non-communicable diseases.  Although there has been an improvement in the 
rate of maternal mortality, this increase has slowed recently.   There has been a gradual improvement in 
the infant mortality rate from 13.1 per 1000 live births in 1990 to 6.4 in 2008 (WHO, 2009).  Malaysia 
spends 4.8% of its Gross Domestic product on health, which includes public and private expenditure.  44.8% 
of total health expenditure is provided by the public sector and this has remained unchanged over the last 
5 years (World Bank, 2009).  Since 2004, private health expenditure has been greater than public health 
expenditure (MOH, 2009)  
 
Malaysia public health care system 
Public sector health care services are subsidised and provided free at the point of access or at low cost.  The 
public health care sector consists of 122 hospitals, which are general hospitals, district hospitals or 
specialist medical institutions.  Polyclinics and rural clinics also provide health care. 
 
The state played a key role in the financing of health care until the 1980s.  GPs provide  primary health care 
in urban centres and small towns. Rural health centres and district hospitals provided care for rural 
population (Leng & Barraclough, 2007).  The first private hospital was set up in 1973.  Private hospitals 
began to expand from the 1980s, due to a fall in the quality of government health care services and the 
rising demands of a growing middle class (Leng & Barraclough, 2007). 
 
In parallel to the expansion of the private sector, the corporatisation of public hospitals is a major change 
that has affected the way in which the public health care sector operates.   Public hospitals are expected to 
operate in the same way as private companies, working towards targets and income generation.  The 
results of interviews with trade unionists in 2003, set out later in this case study, show how corporatisation 
affects the control that health workers have over their work. 
 
Health care is funded through a) tax revenue collected by the government, b) by fee for service, and c) by 
employer-financed health benefit schemes (Rasiah et al, 2009).  Public sector health care is funded through 
taxation, from the federal government (Rasiah et al, 2009). 
 
Privatisation 
The introduction of a national privatisation policy in 1983 was accompanied by ‘Malaysia Incorporated’ and 
the development of Malaysia as a corporate entity.  The state facilitated economic growth but the private 
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sector was the main driver for growth.  Only in the 1990s did the privatisation policy start to impact on the 
health care sector, with the privatisation of the government medical stores (drug manufacturing, 
procurement and distribution centre) (Leng & Barraclough, 2007:20).    
 
Privatisation of public health care services was a contentious issue but the establishment of private 
hospitals was less so.  A gradual growth of private hospitals took place from the 1980s.  There was no 
positive government policy towards either stimulating the private provision or in limiting and controlling it.  
No regulatory structures were set up to oversee the private sector.   Only by 1998, was regulatory 
legislation introduced and new legislation passed in 2006.  Tax incentives were made available for the 
private health care sector, e.g. industrial building allowance for hospitals buildings, exemption from service 
tax for expenses on medical advice and use of medical equipment and tax deduction for expenses for pre-
employment training (Peng & Barraclough, 2007: 21).  This shows how the private health sector has 
benefitted from government subsidies, even though there has not been a specific government policy for 
developing the private health care sector. 
 
The concept of the public and private sectors ‘sharing provision’ was introduced by the government, with 
the private sector providing services for those who could afford to pay.  Tax concessions for medical 
expenses were made available for individuals, children and grandparents, which effectively covered whole 
families.  This led to a government announcement in the 1996-2000 Seventh Malaysia Plan that everyone 
would be expected to pay for health care included those using public services (WHO, 2009).   
 
Since the 1980s, and the expansion of private hospitals, there has been an increase in out of pocket 
spending on health care to 40%, which is 70% of private health expenditure (MOH, 2009). Employers have 
also started to make a significant contribution to health care costs.  There is personal tax relief on health 
insurance.  A medical savings scheme, the Employees Provident Funds (1994) can now be drawn on for a 
risk-related medical insurance scheme offered by Life Insurers Association of Malaysia, a private company 
(Rasiah et al, 2009). 
 
Privatisation of hospital support services  
The government has been involved in the privatisation of four health care services.  These include 
pharmaceutical services, hospital support services, monitoring & consultancy services and monitoring and 
supervision of foreign workers health certification (Nambiar, 2009:29).  The supply of pharmaceutical 
services was contracted to Pharmaniaga Logistics, a private company, for a 15 year period. There is no 
specific regulatory authority but the National Pharmaceutical Bureau, the Ministry of Health and the Price 
Committee are joint regulators.   Hospitals support services were contracted out to Pantai Medivest and 
Faber Mediserve for 15 years, although these companies did not have any background in providing support 
services.  The regulatory arrangements were only put in place a year after privatisation.  The two 
companies were given effective control of specific regions of the country so that they created an effective 
regional monopoly (Nambiar, 2009).   
 
Private hospitals 
The number of private hospitals has increased from 10 in 1980 to 128 in 2003.  This is reflected in an 
increase in the share of hospitals beds provided by the private sector, which has risen from 5.8 - 28.4%.   
This expansion has been facilitated by an increase in national income.  However, 78% of the population is 
still dependent on the public hospital sector and 18% on private hospitals. 54% of the population use 
private clinics and 39 % use public facilities.  Half of the private hospitals have under 50 beds or fewer.  
There are 13 large private hospitals with four not-for-profit.  Two of the not-for-profit hospitals have origins 
in Chinese community and two have religious origins  (Chee & Barraclough, 2007). 
 
Many of the private hospitals were originally set up by doctors but have been sold to for-profit companies. 
For example, the Penang Medical Centre was set up by doctors but was then sold to the Gleneagles group, 
now owned by Parkway Holdings, based in Singapore.  Private hospitals were also set up by property 
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groups as part of the construction of a neighbourhood/ township. For example, Subang Jaya Medical Centre 
is owned by Sime Darby, the company which built Subang Jaya.  As a company, it was originally involved in 
plantations and now has a wide range of investments (Chee & Barraclough, 2007). 
 
The expansion of the private healthcare sector should also be considered in the context of the Bumiputeral 
Malays, the creation of public enterprises set up to accumulate capital. The state is also investing in health 
care.  One of the largest investors is a state corporation, Kumpulan Perubaten (Johor) KPJ Health care, 
owned by the Johor State Economic Development Corporation.  It owns 13 private hospitals in Malaysia.  
Other state governments have become involved in private health care.  The privatisation of public 
enterprises has also contributed private capital to Bumiputera (Rasiah et al, 2009).  State investment in the 
private health care sector has led to increased links between the private and public sectors as seen through 
attendance by politicians, government officials and the private health care sector at conferences and other 
social gatherings (Rasiah et al, 2009)..  
 
Hospital ownership is beginning to be globalised, with multinational companies operating private hospitals. 
This is bringing international capital into the private Malaysian market.  Malaysian capital is also starting to 
invest internationally.  Khazanah Nasional Holdings have invested in Apollo hospitals in India and Parkway 
Holdings in Singapore (Chee & Barracligh, 2007). 
 
A further factor that is stimulating the growth of private hospitals is medical tourism.  Supported by the 
Malaysian government policy to increase revenue from tourism, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 pushed 
companies to develop expansion strategies to attract international patients.  The Ministry of Health is 
facilitating the marketing and regulating advertising and fees of 34 private hospitals (Chee & Barraclough, 
2007).  The Ministry of International Trade and Industry also contributes.  Tax incentives are given to 
private hospitals involved in medical tourism (Chee & Barraclough, 2007). 
 
The Malaysian state has strong links to the private health care sector.  The Ministry of Health is responsible 
for population health (government health services) as well as for private hospital and medical tourism 
developments. This dual role, played by the Ministry of Health, has led to a movement of health personnel 
from the public to the private health care sector.  Doctors are now required to work a set number of hours 
for the public health care sector, a policy introduced as a way of addressing the shortage of health workers 
in the public sector.  With weak regulation, private hospitals can locate where they choose, most often in 
affluent urban areas.   In addition, a process of privatisation has taken place where private companies 
provide services in government hospitals.   
 
Out-of-pocket health payments are used to pay for private health care and government health care is still 
funded by taxation.  However, the increase in out-of pocket payments is part of the refocusing of 
government policy on health care financing.  Some draft health policy goals for 2020 were identified as: 
population health; national capacity building for health: and national capacity building towards 
competitiveness in the health market (WHO, 2009).   This shows how establishing a market in the health 
care sector is a major government goal over the next decade.  The 9th Malaysian Plan, 2006-2010, reflected 
a goal of developing a ‘national health care financing mechanism’.  The government argues that the 
demand for health care and the changing disease profile (more non-communicable diseases) is resulting in 
higher health care costs (WHO, 2009).  These will have to be paid for so that health care is ‘accessible, 
affordable and relevant’ to those who need it.  This does not necessarily mean increasing the level of 
taxation but moving towards a social insurance system. 
  
Equity of health care and access to services; 
Health has been an important public service provided by the government since Independence. Since 1996, 
government health expenditure has increased but is has not necessarily led to improvements in health care 
coverage for the population because some of the increase is due to the increased expenditure on 
contracting out of hospital support services (Wee and Jomo, 2007).  More health care facilities are located 
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in the urban areas, where the population with the highest incomes live.  Private doctors tend to locate in 
urban areas.   
 
The three largest and poorest provinces have the lowest percentage of population living within 5 
kilometres of a health facility.  There are longer waiting times in poorer provinces because of fewer 
doctors.  Distance and poor facilities can be a barrier for poorer people accessing health care (Wee & Jomo, 
2007).    
 
Lower income groups are more likely to use government health services than higher income groups and the 
gap between these two groups has widened in the last two decades.  The higher income groups tend to use 
government facilities for in-patient care rather than out-patient care.  The growth in private health care 
services since the 1980s has benefitted the higher income groups because they are able to pay.  However, 
access by low income groups to government services is threatened because of the migration of government 
health workers to the private sector and the introduction of user fees for government health care, 
introduced by the government (Wee & Jome, 2007) 
   
Labour 
Health care workers have been affected by the corporatisation of the public health care sector and by the 
expansion of the private sector.  Public sector health workers have moved to the private sector within 
Malaysia and have also migrated to Europe to find better paid work.  A study of trade union responses to 
corporatisation of public sector teaching hospital is used to inform an account of how labour has been 
affected by the changed relationship between public and private sectors (Foon Fang & Lethbridge,2004). 
 
Corporatisation of a public sector hospital involves the adoption of private sector organisational approach, 
with the introduction of business plans, target setting and close the decentralisation of cost centres.   This 
leads to changes in attitude of staff, with a greater focus on money.  With an increased focus on costs, staff 
are often laid off and the workload for remaining staff increases.  This puts pressure on individual workers.  
New salary schemes are introduced and there is an increase in workers on temporary or time limited 
contracts, resulting in a loss of job security.  Working practices often change after the contracting out of 
services.  Health and safety is no longer a priority and training in protection and prevention is reduced.   
 
The creation of a private patient’s unit drew existing staff away from public sector work.  Existing staff had 
to cover for a health worker in the private patient’s unit.  Sometimes staff worked long hours on both 
public and private wards, which affected the quality of their work.  Private practice raised difficult 
questions for trade unions because they wanted to ensure their members had access to opportunities to 
increase their income.  However, some specialties were more successful at attracting private patients, 
which led to some health workers to get special allowances.  Other health workers and ancillary workers 
who were not directly involved in high income generation, did not benefit and so had lower pay.  
Introduction of competition within the public sector affects the equity and equality of health workers. 
 
Promotion prospects expanded in the last five years.  Many new units have been opened which need 
experienced and qualified staff, which means more senior grades are created.   However the Malayan 
Nurses Union has found that promotion prospects are still the same because of the vacancies.  Due to the 
large number of nurses at lower levels, the opportunities for promotion are limited.  A nurse often waits 
10-15 years for a level of promotion. 
 
Problems are often solved by contracting out services rather than working together to solve a problem.  
When a union brought up issues concerning disposal of waste, including clinical and chemical waste, the 
reaction of the hospital was to privatise the service, rather than working to find a solution. This resulted in 
a company being contracted to dispose of the waste but “clinical waste is now charged according to weight 
and is a more expensive service”. 
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The Malayan Nurses Union felt that opportunities for training have increased but because of the shortage 
of staff, it is difficult to release staff to go for training and only one at a time.  Anyone over 45 is not 
considered for long term (6-12 months) courses. For those who want to study further, they have to go on 
unpaid leave as they can’t apply for scholarships 
The Malaysian government passed Convention 98 so that ministries and government departments do not 
qualify for collective bargaining rights.  There is also no mechanism for resolving disputes in the 
government sector.  There has been an increase in the number of people joining a trade union.  The private 
hospitals can form unions for one hospital but are not allowed to form a national union of private hospitals. 
 
Workers have been directly affected by processes of corporatisation and privatisation.  Increased work 
loads and reduced job security are two of the most frequent experiences. Reductions in resources going to 
the public sector have resulted in a movement of health workers to the private sector or to jobs outside 
Malaysia.  This is affected the quality of public health care services.  
 
Challenges to the process of privatisation 
There have been some attempts by civil society organisations to challenge the process of privatisation.  In 
1998, the Malaysia Citizen’s Health Initiative (CHI), was launched, which described itself as an “informal 
grouping of organizations and individuals seeking to promote greater community involvement in healthcare 
reforms, and more generally in matters of health policy”.  As an alliance of trade unions and civil society 
groups, it won a campaign to stop the privatisation of public sector hospitals in Malaysia in May 1999 
(Lethbridge, 2004).   
 
In 2004, another coalition to fight for public health care was set up. The Coalition Against Health Care 
Privatization (CAHCP) was formed from a coalition of 81 NGOs, trade unions and political parties, many of 
which had also endorsed the Citizens’ Health Manifesto a few years earlier (Chee & Barraclough, 2007a).    
This new coalition was formed because, although the government has agreed abandon corporatization of 
the public health care system, there were other changes introduced that were contributing to undermining 
public health care.  Private practice was allowed in public hospitals.  More outsourcing was introduced.  A 
proposed compulsory insurance scheme would have allowed entitlements in private hospitals.  CAHCP has 
been campaigning to change the overall health care policy and to safeguard public health care through 
lobbying and mobilisation (Chee & Barraclough, 2007a).  Both CHI and CAHCP tried to influence the health 
policy discourse and move it away from privatisation to a more welfare based model based on universal 
access.  Health has been an issue that has brought together different ethnic and cultural groups.   
 
Conclusion 
This study of changes in health care in Malaysia shows how the process of health care privatisation can 
evolve without a specific government strategy.  A level of dissatisfaction with government services can lead 
to the growth of private health care services.  Both state agencies and private companies have contributed 
to the growth of private health care. 
 
State investment agencies have invested in private health care as part of national economic development 
strategies.  Private companies have diversified from plantation, construction or other activities into health 
care.  The Ministry of Health now has two conflicting roles: a responsibility for the public health care sector 
and a supporter of private health care.  The formation of an alliance of politicians, private investors and the 
private health care providers is shaping a wider agenda about how health care is financed.  Although civil 
society organisations have challenged privatisation, there is no sign that the policy has been defeated. 
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12 Conclusion  
 
The conclusions of this review to develop ‘A parallel approach to analysis of costs/benefits and efficiency 
changes resulting from privatisation of health services’ in order to identify the evidence of the impact of 
health care marketisation and privatisation on services users and health workers will be discussed in the 
following sections: 
 Processes of marketisation and privatisation; 
 Impact on health workers; 
 Impact on service delivery and services users; 
 Implications for the future; 
 Types of research. 
 
Processes of marketisation and privatisation 
The marketisation of public health care systems is part of a long process, which is not necessarily clearly set 
out or understood at the beginning.  Public policy plays an important role in creating internal markets and 
changing public health care systems.  The findings show that there are now recognisable steps in the 
process of moving from a state/ government run health care system to a marketised and privatised system 
but this can take place over many years.  It is a more complex process than the privatisation of public 
utilities. 
 
One of the most significant changes is the introduction of decentralisation policies which transfer 
responsibility for management and funding from national/ central government to local level, whether local 
government or hospital and institutional levels.  Decentralisation is presented as benefiting local people 
because it gives greater control over decision making.  When it is linked to reduced resource allocation 
from government with no balancing powers of local taxation, the result is often a reduction in resources, 
leading to cuts in services.  The impact of decentralisation can be seen throughout the world.  Within 
Europe, there are different gradations of decentralisation policies.  In some countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, decentralisation was a radical policy which resulted in large cuts in budgets.   In Western 
Europe, a more gradual transfer of power to local authorities has occurred with reductions from central 
government funding. 
 
Impact on service delivery and services users 
Corporatisation or self management of hospitals accompanied by reduced central funding change the ways 
in which a public health care institution operates.  Corporatisation involves adopting private sector ways of 
operating, with business plans, targets and cost centres.  These measures begin to alter the way in which 
public health care services operate.  Hospitals become more concerned with reducing the costs of service 
delivery than with delivering improved quality of care.    
 
In many countries, the last two decades have seen an increase in the amount of out-of-pocket spending on 
health care in both low and high income countries.   Co-payments or user fees are introduced for services 
that were previously free at the point of use.  In some countries, the information about user fees is 
provided in a transparent way.  In many countries, where health workers have had reductions in wages or 
are paid erratically, patients may have to pay informal payments to obtain access to health care.   Although 
there are some national traditions of providing health professionals with a gift after treatment, this has 
become more widespread since budget reforms.  This is a form of corruption in that health workers are 
using public facilities for individual private gain. 
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Impact on health workers 
The status and integrity of health workers is directly affected by decentralisation and other health reforms.  
Cutting costs of labour intensive activities, such as health and social care results, results in cuts in the 
labour force or reductions in salaries.  This affects the quality of care.  For health workers, reductions in 
salaries and irregularly paid salaries, forces them to secure alternative sources of income.  Reductions in 
wages lead to corruption as workers struggle to make a living.  Workers experience much greater job 
insecurity.   This affects the ‘ethos’ of public health care services in ways that are detrimental to both 
health workers and service users because health workers put their own financial survival before the 
delivery of a public health care service. 
 
Implications for the future 
The impact of marketisation and privatisation are being felt in many countries.  Gradually the structures of 
public health care are being eroded or dismantled.  The growth of out-of-pocket care is placing a greater 
burden on many service users and governments are beginning to use this to question the financing of 
public health care.  As increased taxation is not considered an option to pay for increased cost of health 
care, new health insurance is being presented as an option for the future.  
 
Several policies, such as decentralisation, create changes in the way in which hospitals operate that lead to 
strategies of income generation and self-management.   Health care institutions start to function as private 
companies.  Legislation is often introduced to enable them to have direct control over their assets and to 
be able to borrow money.  This has implications for the future because whilst hospitals remain as part of a 
national health service, the risks of going bankrupt are safeguarded by central government.  When 
hospitals operate as private companies, the prospect of failure becomes more likely.  This opens the 
prospect of private companies taking over and potentially asset stripping what were public sector assets. 
 
Public and private sectors operate in different ways with different priorities. This has implications for the 
‘public sector ethos’ underpinning public services.  The evidence of long term care homes show that private 
sector owners have an obligation to their shareholders, which affects their costs and the quality of care 
they provide.  The privatisation of social care can be seen as an indicator of what the privatisation of health 
care will bring.  Apart from reductions in the quality of care, it also brings a loss of local control over public 
services which should be responding to local needs.    
 
Decentralisation also has an impact on equity across a country.  Leaving decision making to local groups can 
result in greater variations in the types of services and service quality across a country.  In the long term 
this will result in greater health inequalities.  Unless central government has powers to introduce minimum 
standards of services, it will be difficult for any government to address health inequities. 
 
Type of research 
Health care marketisation and privatisation, introduced under the guise of health sector reform, have been 
the subject of research by academics, government agencies and civil society organisations.  Academic and 
government research have greater resources and the links between universities and government are 
increasingly intertwined.  This influences the types of research that have been commissioned to look at the 
impact of health sector reform. 
 
The rhetoric of health sector reform promoted the need for effectiveness, efficiency and equity but 
implementation and the resulting research has focused on effectiveness and efficiency.    Research into 
health care efficiency has used methodologies and instruments that were created for measuring industrial 
efficiency, developed for the private sector.  Health care is not an industrial production process.  It is 
dependent on the quality of care as much as the specific health care intervention.  There is a surprising lack 
of quality measures of health and social care.  Studies that have looked at the effectiveness of care in long 
term care homes consider health outcomes but not quality of life.  There is a similar absence of systematic 
research that looks at quality of health care.  Future research needs to address ways of measuring in 
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quantitative and qualitative ways, what is quality health and social care.   In assessing quality health and 
social care, it is important to recognise that not everything can be quantified. 
 
Jane Lethbridge  
12 September 2011 
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